Nuclear Issues

The initial stage of the war in Ukraine has confounded expectations. Russia’s military invasion failed in key objectives, upending predictions of a rout of Ukraine. Then, after years of avoiding direct confrontations with Moscow, Western nations are now directly punishing Russian President Vladimir Putin and his allies with truly devastating economic sanctions while openly supplying arms to Ukraine.

Though there were peace talks for the first time on Monday, there are no signs that the cycle of escalation will go down. Amid unprecedented global pressure, Putin is doubling down on a defensive posture that pits Russia against almost everyone else in the world. He has ratcheted up the levels of violence in eastern Ukraine, bombarding the city of Kharkiv with suspected cluster munitions, while putting the country’s nuclear arsenal on alert.

Nuclear experts are trained to think the unthinkable. So, here is an unthinkable scenario that might actually happen in real life:

The battle over Ukraine drags on. From both the European Union and the United States, fresh weapons and other supplies continue to enter into Ukraine and allow the Ukrainian forces to fight on. The battle reaches what conflict resolution expert William Zartman calls “a hurting stalemate” situation. The balance of forces on the ground is not completely or perfectly symmetrical, but what was once considered a completely disproportioned asymmetry of forces has been gradually re-equilibrated, in favor of the Ukrainian forces.

Concerns are mounting about the safety of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors and the possibility of an ecological disaster in the midst of the Russian invasion.

“There are contingencies but I doubt that these power plants have prepared for a full-scale invasion,” said Mariana Budjeryn, a Ukrainian research associate with Harvard University’s project on managing the atom. “In the middle of a large scale conflict, there’s a myriad of things that could happen, for which normal, even very robust, safety procedures at a nuclear power plant [would be insufficient].”

In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its current threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, it’s fair to ask: What is the significance now of the Budapest Memorandum?

With tensions growing between the United States and other nuclear-armed rivals, it is easy to forget that non-state actors continue to pose a serious nuclear threat. Yet, despite continuing evidence of this threat, in 2021, the headwinds confronting those working to reduce it only got stronger. 

Efforts to reduce nuclear terrorism risks have entered a new era. Nuclear operators must defend against threats they have been aware of for decades—like well-funded and sophisticated non-state actors with global reach, malicious insiders, corruption—while learning to be resilient against new threats, such as those posed by adversaries employing new technologies or evolving pathogens that could cripple security forces.

Whenever Washington or Moscow unveils a new weapon, ears in the other capital perk up and analysts try to divine how the new system fits into U.S. or Russian military strategy—not least of all, strategy toward its Cold War-era nemesis. But how often do decisions related to national security arise because of institutional forces only tenuously related to states’ strategic planning? More specifically, how do the countries’ respective defense industries influence policy? The Belfer Center’s Russia Matters project asked two scholars—one American, one Russian—to investigate the latter question. Their articles, published in November, reveal fascinating differences (and similarities) in the way this influence is exercised in countries with vastly different political and economic systems.

The probability of terrorists getting and using a nuclear bomb appears to be low—but the consequences if they did would be so devastating that it is worth beefing up efforts to make sure terrorists never get their hands on a nuclear bomb’s essential ingredients. To see the possibilities, we need to look at motive, capability, and opportunity.

On Sept. 13, 2021, Prof. Matthew Bunn presented his work on the evolving global threat to nuclear and radiological transports to the Transport Security Unified Stakeholders Group.

Today, US-Russian political relations are as poisonous as they have been in decades. Former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and former Senator Sam Nunn have warned that “not since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 has the risk of a US-Russian confrontation involving the use of nuclear weapons been as high as it is today." In Washington, there is more talk of new sanctions than of paths to cooperation. Nevertheless, there are some hints in both capitals that despite the larger political confrontation, both sides would like to find areas of common interest where cooperation might be possible. The next time the US and Russian presidents meet and issue a joint statement, they should include direction for their nuclear experts to begin working together again— on an agenda that includes nuclear energy, nuclear security, nonproliferation, technologies for verifying future arms agreements, and more.

The coronavirus pandemic has had a significant impact on the nuclear industry, complicating operations and altering the delivery of both safety and security. This has generated concerns over the ability of governments and industry to provide vital services, while also protecting against changing threats that have evolved to take advantage of the pandemic. Christopher Hobbs, Nickolas Roth and Daniel Salisbury examine the nuclear security community’s response to this challenge, exploring how the risk landscape has been changed by the pandemic and the efficacy of new security solutions.