Nuclear Issues

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s most recent announcement on Iran policy has raised some eyebrows. He indicated on Monday morning that the Trump administration will not renew waivers to importers of Iranian crude and that other suppliers (meaning Saudi Arabia) have agreed to increase production in to ensure the global oil market remains well-supplied. Skeptics question whether — after last summer’s debacle — there is sufficient trust between Washington and Riyadh for this arrangement to work. What skeptics may not have digested is that, while timing remains a problem, this is a classic win-win situation. It is a near-perfect example of the very limited universe of occasions when transactional diplomacy could actually work.

The authors write that Vietnam will play host to a critical meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and it will benefit from their peace efforts regardless of the outcome.

In its Feb. 13 judgment, the International Court of Justice framed the Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. United States) case as a simple case about treaty interpretation. It significantly narrowed what could have been a major case on the international law of state immunity, which would likely have resulted in a rebuke of U.S. practice with respect to the terrorism exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Chuck Freilich writes that while the international community has recently been consumed by the gruesome murder of a Saudi journalist, nothing really has changed. The Saudi regime has long been the most heinous on earth, but the overarching strategic considerations that have militated for ongoing cooperation with it continue to do so. The Iranian regime is no more attractive than the Saudi one, and its pursuit of regional hegemony and nuclear weapons make it the far greater danger. Iran must remain the primary focus of Israel's attention.

Not only would sanctioning SWIFT be a major escalation in U.S. sanctions policy, but an entirely reckless decision. Realistically, enforcing sanctions against SWIFT would have significant consequences for both the U.S. and global financial system—upending decades of international norms.

Although it remains to be seen whether or not the Iran nuclear deal is salvageable, there are few incentives left for Iran to implement anti-money laundering reforms. For better or worse, the Financial Action Task Force and the future of the JCPOA have become politically intertwined as a consequence of US unilateral sanctions.

Elena Chachko analyzes the October 3, 2018 ruling by International Court of Justice on a case in which Iran sought fully re-instated sanctions relief from the United States, which was part of the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.