Nuclear Issues

How do presidents incorporate morality into decisions involving the national interest? Moral considerations explain why Truman, who authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II, later refused General MacArthur's request to use them in China during the Korean War. What is contextual intelligence, and how does it explain why Bush 41 is ranked first in foreign policy, but Bush 43 is found wanting? Is it possible for a president to lie in the service of the public interest? In this episode, Professor Joseph S. Nye considers these questions as he explores the role of morality in presidential decision-making from FDR to Trump.

Joseph Nye's new book rates the efforts of presidents from FDR to Trump.

Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies.

Stephen Walt writes that lacking coherent objectives and a strategy for achieving them, moves like the assassination of Qassem Suleimani are foreign policy as theater—and could leave the United States worse off.

It seems unlikely that Russia will again possess the resources to balance U.S. power in the same way that the Soviet Union did during the four decades after World War II. But declining powers merit as much diplomatic attention as rising ones do. Joseph S. Nye worries that the United States lacks a strategy to prevent Russia from becoming an international spoiler.

Stephen Walt writes that getting a new nuclear deal with Iran won't be easy—but the U.S. president's utter lack of principle could help guide the way.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has asked top experts from a variety of countries and with a variety of points of view to offer their best and most realistic advice on how the U.S.-Iran impasse might be broken, so a war that neither the United States nor Iran seems eager to begin can be averted. Chuck Freilich writes that the objective is a better deal, and a combination of coercive diplomacy, applied patiently over time, along with a willingness to compromise may make this possible. A "better deal" can only be achieved, however, if it is better for both sides. 

Chuck Freilich describes the circumstances under which Israel may pay the price for an overly hasty deal with Iran.

Stephen Walt writes that critics of offshore balancing claim a more restrained U.S. foreign policy will breed insecurity.  He then debunks five of their arguments.

Right now, everything both sides do to strengthen their defenses looks to the other side like preparation for attack.