Nuclear Issues

58 Items

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the launch of a Hwasong-14 ICBM in North Korea on July 4, 2017.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea

| Winter 2021/22

The costly Ground-based Midcourse Defense system remains unproven and unreliable in deterring North Korea’s threat to use intercontinental ballistic missiles. An airborne boost-phase intercept system may offer an alternative defense against North Korea without threatening Russian or Chinese deterrents.

US and Ukrainian soldiers stand guard during opening ceremony of the 'Fiarles Guardian - 2015', Ukrainian-US Peacekeeping and Security command and staff training, in western Ukraine, in Lviv region, Monday, April 20, 2015.

(AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

Magazine Article - The National Interest

Russia and America: Stumbling to War

| May-June 2015

In the United States and Europe, many believe that the best way to prevent Russia’s resumption of its historic imperial mission is to assure the independence of Ukraine. They insist that the West must do whatever is required to stop the Kremlin from establishing direct or indirect control over that country. Otherwise, they foresee Russia reassembling the former Soviet empire and threatening all of Europe. Conversely, in Russia, many claim that while Russia is willing to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), Moscow will demand no less than any other great power would on its border. Security on its western frontier requires a special relationship with Ukraine and a degree of deference expected in major powers’ spheres of influence. More specifically, Russia’s establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From their perspective, this makes Ukraine’s nonadversarial status a nonnegotiable demand for any Russia powerful enough to defend its national-security interests.

Pakistan's battlefield nuclear weapons are to be used at the India-Pakistan border much earlier in an conflict.

NUKEMAP Image

Journal Article - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Destroying Pakistan to Deter India? The Problem with Pakistan's Battlefield Nukes

| July 2014

At first glance, the main advantage of Pakistan's new battlefield nuclear weapon—known as the Nasr missile—would appear to be its ability to slowdown and stop an armored attack by the Indian Army inside Pakistan, before it reaches vital cities. But deeper examination reveals that deploying this particular weapon on the battlefield against an advancing Indian armored column would cause substantial deaths and injuries to Pakistani citizens, rendering its purpose moot.

Indian soldiers raise the Indian flag at the test site Shakti 1, where India tested five nuclear devices last week, before a visit by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Pokaran Wednesday, May 20, 1998.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb

    Author:
  • Andrew B. Kennedy
| Fall 2011

After decades of flirting with nuclear weapons, India finally emerged as a nuclear power in the 1990s. New evidence suggests that India was able to hold off in part because it was able to secure protection through an alternate method: implicit “umbrellas” from superpowers. In the late 1970s, however, U.S. support for India waned as it began to improve its relations with Pakistan, and India lost its other major backer with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, India could no longer protect itself through diplomatic means, and acquisition of the bomb became an inevitable response to its security needs.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe responds to questions delivered by opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa during a Parliamentary debate. Abe insisted his government would not stray from its non-nuclear policy.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb

    Author:
  • Jacques E.C. Hymans
| Fall 2011

Although Japanese politicians have expressed interest in the bomb in the past, the country’s veto players make acquisition unlikely. Early research viewed proliferation exclusively as a response to security needs.  Since the 1980s, most models have included domestic factors, but they have focused exclusively on a single actor whose influence can be negated if veto power is widely enough dispersed. Thus, despite Japan’s intimidating plutonium supply, and its persistence in building a complete fuel cycle, the country’s large and growing number of veto players suggests the continuation of a rigid nuclear weapons policy. As this analysis indicates, historical institutional analysis is crucial to understanding a state’s propensity for proliferation and should be considered alongside other contributing factors.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note

    Author:
  • Pavel Podvig
| Summer 2008

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security

Summer 2008

In recent years, American treaty behavior has produced growing concern among both allies and less friendly nations. On such fundamental issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human rights, civil liberties, environmental disasters, and commerce, the United States has generated confusion and anger abroad. Such a climate is not conducive to needed cooperation in the conduct of foreign and security policy. Among U.S. actions that have caused concern are the failure to ratify several treaties; the attachment of reservations, understandings, and declarations before ratification; the failure to support a treaty regime once ratified; and treaty withdrawal. The structural and historical reasons for American treaty behavior are deeply rooted in the United States' system of government and do not merely reflect superpower arrogance.

Indian Army Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor, front second right, arrives at an army base in Beerwah during a two-day visit to Indian Kashmir.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine

    Author:
  • Walter C. Ladwig III
| Winter 2007/08

India’s inability to coerce Pakistan into halting its support for insurgents in Kashmir, as well as its experience in past conflicts with Pakistan, led it to develop Cold Start—a new offensive military doctrine that will allow it to mobilize quickly and retaliate in a limited manner. Although India is far from realizing its goal, this break from a traditional defensive strategy deserves scrutiny. A history of misperception and mistrust between India and Pakistan, poor intelligence, and domestic insecurity suggests that limited war could quickly escalate to the nuclear threshold, posing a serious risk to the stability of the subcontinent and the rest of the world.