Nuclear Issues

74 Items

Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, left, speaks next to Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette, during a news conference

AP/Jacquelyn Martin

Policy Brief - Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; Toda Peace Institute

Nuclear Battleground: Debating the US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

| June 2018

This Policy Brief compares and contrasts the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review with past reviews and its Obama predecessor. It concludes that this review offers a much harsher assessment of the security environment; it posits a more expansive role for nuclear weapons; and proposes a substantial de-emphasis on arms control.

During a re-enactment in a park in southern Tehran, members of the Iranian Basij paramilitary force re-enact fighting in the 1980–88 war with Iraq.

AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Managing U.S.-Iran Relations: Critical Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War

| November 2017

The best way to address the various challenges associated with Iranian behavior—meaning the one most likely to succeed and to bolster long-term U.S. security interests—is to preserve and build on the nuclear deal. Doing so would enable Iran to reconsider the lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, which taught it that it cannot trust the international organizations and world powers that seek to isolate it and undermine its security.

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

Wikimedia Commons

Policy Brief - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Iran Stockpiling Uranium Far Above Current Needs

| January 10, 2017

In a televised speech on January 1, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Tehran had imported 200 metric tons of yellowcake uranium and would import another 120 tons at an unspecified future date. The imports are permitted by the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but nonetheless significantly exceed Iran’s needs for natural (that is, unenriched) uranium over the next 15 years. Iran’s import of such high levels of uranium suggests it may be stockpiling uranium to reach nuclear breakout before the deal’s initial limitations expire in 2031.

The JCPOA permits Iran to buy natural uranium to “replenish” its stocks as it sells enriched uranium on the international market. To date, Iran has had difficulties locating a buyer for its enriched uranium stocks – unsurprising, given the current excess of commercially available enriched uranium. This, however, has not stopped Iran from buying and stockpiling more yellowcake.

The Royal Navy's 16,000 ton Trident-class nuclear submarine Vanguard, January 30, 2002

AP

Policy Brief - Stanley Foundation

Descending From the Summit: The Path Toward Nuclear Security 2010–2016 and Beyond

| September 2016

William H. Tobey reviews the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the nuclear security summits and provides recommendations for how governments can maintain momentum and awareness now that the summit process is over. He concludes that some of the innovations from the process will continue to be useful tools.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif shake hands after a news conference at the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, June 15, 2016.

AP

Policy Brief - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

EU-Iran Nuclear Cooperation: The Case for Stronger Safety and Nonproliferation Standards

| June 27, 2016

The constraints imposed on Iran’s activities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) curb Tehran’s nuclear program for eight to 15 years. The key restrictions on the program, however, disappear over time, leaving Tehran with an industrial-size nuclear program with near-zero nuclear breakout time and an easier, advance-centrifuge-powered clandestine “sneak out” time.

Aerial view of a heavy-water production plant in the central Iranian town of Arak.

AP

Policy Brief - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

IAEA Takes a Light Touch on Iran’s Heavy Water

| April 28, 2016

The IAEA’s reporting has been insufficiently clear regarding Iranian inventories of nuclear material. Iran is continuously enriching uranium and producing heavy water, and exceeding the JCPOA’s limits threatens to cut its nuclear breakout time. A clear, unambiguous IAEA accounting of Tehran’s nuclear inventories is therefore all the more essential.

Delegates wait for the start of the board of governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, December 15, 2015.

AP

Policy Brief - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Next Steps in the Implementation of the JCPOA

| December 8, 2015

When the new report is brought before the IAEA’s Board of Governors on December 15, it should adopt a resolution based on: a credible baseline for monitoring and verification; assurances, with high confidence, that all weapons-related activities have been terminated; and future sampling and investigations carried out in-situ by IAEA inspectors and experts.