Security for Nuclear Weapons and Materials

2016 Nuclear Security Index
2016 | Online resource
Nuclear Threat Initiative

The NTI Nuclear Security Index provides a quantitative assessment of the overall nuclear materials security conditions in a country by looking at openly available information on indicators in different categories relevant to the risk of theft. The 2016 version includes a new section on how vulnerable nuclear facilities are to sabotage and cyber attacks.

Prospects for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and Beyond
November 2015 | Conference Panel Transcript
International Institute for Strategic Studies

A special session on this year’s summit was held at the 2015 European Union Non-proliferation and Disarmament Conference. Chaired by IISS’s Matthew Cottee, panel members included Elena Sokova, Deputy Director of James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Werner Bauwens, Belgium’s Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-proliferation; and Thomas Countryman, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation. The discussion included overviews, assessments, and some debate over the summit process’s results.

Bridging the Military Nuclear Materials Gap
2015 | Report
NTI Military Materials Security Study Group

This report, informed by the high-level Military Materials Security Study Group, outlines steps governments should take to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, including strengthening the security of military materials which make up the vast majority weapons-usable nuclear materials in the world.

Nuclear Security in India
2015 | Study
Observer Research Foundation
By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

This paper provides an extensive analysis of nuclear security in India. It examines the measures adopted by India in response to perceived threats, strengths and weaknesses of those measures, and makes recommendations for further strengthening Indian nuclear security. (click here to view)

EU Efforts to Strengthen Nuclear Security
March 2014 | Joint Staff Working Document
European Commission

"Nuclear safety and security have always been absolute priorities for the European Union (EU)....In view of the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, the present Staff Working Document describes recent EU achievements and priorities in the above fields, in particular the main developments since 2012." (click here to view)

Russia’s Nuclear Security Policy: Priorities and Potential Areas for Cooperation
May 2015 | Policy Brief
The Stanley Foundation
Anton Khlopkov

This brief calls for restored nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia and highlights several areas directly related to nuclear security where they share interests and can work together. Despite political differences between the United States and Russia that have led to a halt in nuclear security cooperation, both countries remain committed to nuclear security. (click here to view)

Nuclear Security Briefing Book
2014 | Online Book
King’s College of London and Center for Science and Security Studies

The NSBB offers an introduction to nuclear security and an overview of both the history of international cooperation in the field of nuclear security and the evolution and main outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit process thus far. It also contains the original texts of instruments and initiatives related to international cooperation in nuclear security. (click here to view)

Nuclear Weapons Material Gone Missing: What Does History Teach?
March 2014 | Book
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Edited by Henry Sokolski

"How likely is it that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could detect even a large amount of MUF in a timely fashion at declared civilian nuclear sites? What of national means of detection? What can we learn from the history of civilian MUF discoveries in Japan and the UK and of military MUF in the United States and South Africa? How well can the IAEA or any existing nuclear material accountancy system track the production of special nuclear material or account for past production? This volume gives us more than a few answers" (click here to view)

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons
February 2016 | Report
Congressional Research Service
By Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin

This CRS report praises recent improvements in Pakistan’s export control laws, personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation, but warns political instability continuing plaguing the country continues to pose a threat to the safety of its nuclear weapons and material. (click here to view)

Comprehensive Nuclear Material Accounting
March 2014 | Report
Center for International & Security Studies | University of Maryland
By Nancy Gallagher, Jonas Siegel, and John Steinbruner

"This study examines a range of current material accounting practices and requirements and argues that in order for MC&A to fully perform the functions necessary to reduce global nuclear risks to an acceptably low level, its emphasis needs to transition from ensuring the non-diversion of nuclear materials to military uses to providing positive inventory control of nuclear materials, whereby national and international authorities can actively account for the location and form of all designated nuclear materials on a continuous and detailed basis." (click here to view)

Japan Could be Building an Irresistible Terrorist Threat, Experts Say
March 2014 | Article
Center for Public Integrity
By Jake Adelstein, Douglas Birch, and R. Jeffrey Smith

"Publicly, the United States has said little about Japan’s plans to enlarge its already substantial hoard of plutonium…. But since Obama was first elected, Washington has been lobbying furiously behind the scenes, trying to persuade Japan that terrorists might regard Rokkasho’s new stockpile of plutonium as an irresistible target — and to convince Japanese officials they should better protect this dangerous raw material." (click here to view)

On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security
February 2014 | Working Paper
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland | University of Maryland
By Martha Williams

“Over the past fifty years, the threats posed by nuclear material and nuclear weapons have changed….Because the threat has changed, international and national approaches to nuclear security need to change. Measures should be adopted world-wide that respond to the potential for a non-State actor to acquire and misuse nuclear material.” (click here to view)

Developing a Nuclear Material Accounting and Control System in Russia
December 2013 | Working Paper
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland | University of Maryland
By Dmitry Kovchegin

"When considering the requirements for a global nuclear material accounting system, Russia’s experience in developing its domestic system deserves special attention....First, Russia’s nuclear complex includes all of the types of nuclear facilities and nuclear material handling procedures that would be subject to a global system. Second, Russia has significant experience transitioning from an outdated system to a modern one. Third, Russia has operated its nuclear complex in a financially constrained environment and has relied in part on international assistance. Finally, the Russian nuclear complex is managed by many agencies with their own agendas, priorities, and visions of nuclear material accounting. This experience with an interagency environment may be a model for other countries." (click here to view)

Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step Toward Disarmament
October 2013 | Report
International Panel on Fissile Materials

"This report begins with an overview of current nuclear weapon stocks and of national holdings of fissile materials and then lays out a set of options for a series of increasingly detailed public declarations by nuclear weapon states of their nuclear warhead inventories, and of their production and disposition of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, the fissile materials that are essential in nuclear weapons. It also suggests new cooperative projects that could assist in the eventual verification of such declarations." (click here to view)

The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report
July 2013 | Report
Arms Control Association
By Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Sarah Williams

"This report seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the progress states have made to improve nuclear security over the course of the NSS process, drawing specific attention to actions taken since the Seoul summit. It uses the progress reports submitted by participating states at the 2012 summit, statements made to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, IAEA Nuclear Security Reports, government press releases, and media reports to identify actions countries have taken in support of the summits’ goals." (click here to view)

Special Report - Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration's Y-12 National Security Complex
August 2012
U.S. Department of Energy | Office of Inspector General | Office of Audits and Inspections

This is the official Department of Energy Inspector General report regarding the July 2012 break-in at the facility, in which protesters reached the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility inside the complex without being stopped by security. The report was commissioned days after the event, and it details the security breakdowns at Y-12 on the night of the break-in. It specifically cites failures to respond to alarms, maintain critical security equipment, understand security protocols, over-reliance on compensatory measures, bad contract management, and the presence of poor communications. It also made specific recommendations to the NNSA regarding how to improve security at the facility. (click here to view)

U.S. Russia Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda
June 2012 | Report
Center for Nonproliferation Studies | Center for Energy and National Security Studies | Nuclear Threat Initiative
Edited by Anton Khlopkov and Elena Sokova

This report includes recommendations for U.S.-Russian cooperation in strengthening nuclear security in the former Soviet states and in Southeast Asia. (click here to view)

Further Actions Needed by U.S. Agencies to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Materials
March 2012
U.S. Government Accountability Office 

This GAO report provides an overview and update of President Obama’s 4-year initiative to secure all nuclear material. Drawing heavily from a December 2010 report on the same subject (titled “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide”), this report makes no new recommendations, although it does note that the government’s plan, as approved by the NSC, lacks details regarding the cost and scope of the work. It provides an overview of efforts by U.S. agencies to track nuclear material overseas, but also warns of coordination problems between agencies, specifically citing overlap and the fact that no agency takes a formal lead on the issue. 

Global Fissile Material Report 2011: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production
January 2012 | Report
International Panel on Fissile Materials

"The Global Fissile Material Report 2011 provides updated estimates for global and national stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, and recent developments in military and civilian fissile material production capabilities." (click here to view)

U.S. Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material Overseas
September 2011
U.S. Government Accountability Office

The GAO authored a report assessing the capacity of U.S. agencies to track and account for U.S. nuclear material overseas. Of the approximately 17,500 kilograms of U.S. HEU overseas, DOE and NRC could only account for the location of 1,160 kilograms of it. The report also describes the role of DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative in removing material, although it notes that only about one third of all material abroad is eligible to be repatriated. GAO recommends that NRC compile an inventory of all U.S. nuclear material abroad, and that NRC and State conduct annual inventory checks with all partners to ensure the location of this material is accurate.

All Stocks of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials Worldwide Must be Protected Against Global Terrorist Threats
Winter 2011 | Journal Article
The Journal of Nuclear Materials Management
By Matthew Bunn and Evgeniy P. Malsin

This article argues countries should, at a minimum, protect against a baseline set of adversary capabilities that all stocks of nuclear weapons, plutonium, or HEU should be protected against, no matter what country they are in, including both insiders and outsiders and a range of potential tactics. It recommends that countries facing more substantial adversary threats put even more capable security systems in place. (click here to view)

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide
December 2010
U.S. Government Accountability Office

This December 2010 GAO report reviews the NSC-coordinated strategy to secure all nuclear materials within 4 years. The report notes that specific details regarding the implementation of the strategy are unclear, including the program’s cost and scope. While noting that NNSA programs in Russia have seen much success, GAO also found several implementation challenges to each program. The report specifically highlights concerns regarding Russia’s ongoing political support for NNSA’s MPC&A initiatives and Russia’s ability to sustain these programs once responsibility is shifted from the United States. GAO recommended that DOE and NNSA clarify the cost and scope of MPC&A programs in Russia, and also that the deadline for these activities be extended. It also recommended that NSC take a stronger leadership role over the initiative as a whole, noting that as of writing it lacked a clear inter-agency point of contact. 

NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index - Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action
January 2014 | Report
Nuclear Threat Initiative

"The 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Nuclear Materials Security Index is the second edition of a first-of-its-kind public assessment of nuclear materials security conditions around the world. Developed with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the NTI Index was created (a) to assess the security of weapons-usable nuclear materials around the world and (b) to encourage governments to take actions and provide assurances about the security of the world’s deadliest materials." (click here to view)

  • 2016 Nuclear Security Index

    2016 | Online resource
    Nuclear Threat Initiative

    The NTI Nuclear Security Index provides a quantitative assessment of the overall nuclear materials security conditions in a country by looking at openly available information on indicators in different categories relevant to the risk of theft. The 2016 version includes a new section on how vulnerable nuclear facilities are to sabotage and cyber attacks.