Last week, the Trump administration reimposed unilateral sanctions against Iran. This comes after the administration announced its intention to withdraw from the Iran deal in April, despite compelling reasons not to. Like most of America’s sanctions regimes, Trump’s order to reimpose sanctions rests on authority granted under a little-known and even less understood statute that gives the president sweeping authority to regulate certain aspects of international trade and commerce: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

So far, there seems to be a strong lobby in favor of protecting EU business interests in Iran by proposing sanctions-blocking measures to guard against US secondary sanctions. Ultimately, however, it will be business, not political decisions, that will spell the end of the JCPOA— a lesson almost learned in 1982.

In February, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental body responsible for promoting policies to protect the global financial system—released a report on the financing of WMD proliferation. The new report is a much-anticipated update to the task force’s aging 2008 guidance on proliferation financing. But it is unclear whether the new guidance represents much change—if any—over the 2008 version.

Don’t worry if you have yet to hear about blockchain, the emerging technology set to reshape everything from finance and trade to global governance—you are in good company. According to one recent survey of 12,000 people in 11 countries, 60 percent had never heard of the technology and 80 percent could not explain how it works. Yet, for a technology that few understand, blockchain is sure making waves. The World Economic Foundation (WEF), for example, found that 80 percent of global banks will have initiated blockchain-related projects by the end of 2017. Perhaps even more startling: By 2027, the WEF predicts, 10 percent of global gross domestic product will be held in blockchain technology.

Last week, President Trump signed a new executive order that paves the way to impose sanctions against any foreign bank that conducts business with North Korea, going well beyond current UN financial sanctions. These so-called secondary sanctions, which are penalties applied to third-party foreign banks (i.e., not directly against North Korean entities), are particularly focused on Chinese banks.

In July, North Korea test fired a ballistic missile said to be capable of reaching the United States. Not surprisingly, Kim Jong-un’s provocations have been met with increased calls by congressional leadership and policymakers to ratchet up the pressure on China — North Korea’s lifeline to the international financial system, according to a recent UN report. A difficult question for policymakers now is how far should the United States go to increase pressure against China?

While tensions continue to flare along the Korean peninsula, the Trump administration struggles to articulate its strategy to persuade North Korea to halt its nuclear program. In a recent visit to the de-militarized zone, Vice President Pence warned Pyongyang to not test America’s “strength and resolve,” citing recent U.S. military strikes in Syria and Afghanistan as a forewarning. A not-so-veiled threat that the Trump administration considers “all options” to be on the table. What is unknown, however, is whether this increased rhetoric is merely saber-rattling or is the opening salvo for a true shift from Obama’s doctrine of “strategic patience.” That is, continuing to apply political and economic pressure until Pyongyang returns to the negotiating table.

Current approaches to global supply-side controls to curb the proliferation of nuclear dual-use goods and technologies fail to consider the mechanisms that drive non-state actors to adapt and innovate. Consequently, policymakers are left reacting to, rather than anticipating, new illicit procurement techniques and methods. This article proposes a new analytical framework based on the concept of resilience, which considers how illicit procurement networks change and adapt within environments characterized by risk and uncertainty.

Already, President-elect Donald Trump’s pick for the next US attorney general, Jeff Sessions (R-AL), has caused quite a stir over his domestic policy positions, not to mention his checkered past of making racially charged and divisive statements. Few pundits, however, have discussed what Jeff Sessions’ appointment could mean for the Iran Deal—the agreement negotiated last fall, which provides sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. As the country’s new top cop, Sessions will have sweeping authority to shape the Justice Department’s policies and priorities—some of which have the potential to affect relations with Iran, if indirectly.

Before trashing the Iran deal — the agreement inked last fall, which limits Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief — the incoming Trump administration should consider how a policy of soft economic engagement with Tehran could provide Washington with strategic leverage and increased bargaining power in a post-Iran deal world.

Throughout his campaign, now President-elect Trump attacked the Iran deal, claiming that “it will go down in history as one of the worst deals ever negotiated.” The future of the deal now seems to be far less certain, as Trump fills key positions with outspoken critics of the agreement. Congressman Mike Pompeo (R-KS), Trump’s recent pick for CIA director, is well-known for his hardline stance on the deal, recently noting that it should be “rolled back.”