The authors lay out their case for the United States maintaining a coherent nonproliferation policy in the Middle East and beyond to limit the damage to nuclear nonproliferation efforts and offer three steps for strengthening nonproliferation after withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Ilan Goldenberg and Ariane Tabatabai analyze the consequences of U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Ariane Tabatabai examines Bolton's worldview, nonproliferation track record, and stance on Iran.

The president's tweets suggest he barely understands the country he's repeatedly demonized. This is troublesome given how much influence he has on what happens next.

"The United States and Iran are the two key players in the fight against ISIS, not least of all because they are two of the group's main targets. Indeed, other countries, particularly in Europe, have also been targeted by the group and seen ISIS attempt to recruit among their populations. As a result, they also share an interest in combatting the group. But the United States and Iran have made the fight against ISIS a security policy priority and allocated considerable resources to undertaking efforts in Iraq and Syria. While the two adversaries have aligned interests in Iraq, they have undertaken separate counterterrorism efforts to tackle the group."

"The P5+1, as the group has come to be known, is the official party negotiating with Iran, but it can really be divided into two camps. The Western side is composed of the United States and its European partners: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. China and Russia are the non-Western parties to the talks. Though they all share the goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, each of these actors also has its own agenda. Their respective interests are political, strategic, and economic."

"...U.S. and Iranian strategic interests align on some key issues, including the fight against ISIS and the postcombat mission era in Afghanistan....Today, Tehran is the only actor involved that has enough at stake in Iraq to be willing and able to send in ground troops, should the need arise. In Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to recognize the Taliban as an official government. But Iran has and continues to want the Taliban out of the picture, as does Washington."

"...[P]opular support, the ayatollah and the IRGC's cautious endorsements, and Zarif's efforts to set the terms of this round of debate early on mean that hard-line criticism from Tehran will likely be contained to a few scathing editorials, harsh statements, and attempts to undermine the negotiating team — but no major efforts at sabotage. If only Congress were so predictable."

Is the IAEA a strong enough institution to successfully act as a monitor of this deal?

Yes, but the problem is going to be financing. This is a really resource-intensive project. This is two decades of monitoring a number of facilities, and it's going to need a number of people and equipment. It's going to be a resource-intensive process, but that's something that world powers are signing up for, as they'll need to.

"In the following weeks, the agreement will doubtless receive much criticism. Many will claim that one side or the other made too many concessions. But both sides stand to gain from the framework agreement, which should also be considered a victory for the global nonproliferation regime. Ahead of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that begins in late April, where no major achievements in nonproliferation are likely to be announced, the framework agreement is a very important success."