Currency market volatility has been around for decades, if not centuries.

Wide gyrations in exchange rates became a staple of international financial markets after the Bretton Woods system broke down in the early 1970s, and mega-depreciations were commonplace later in the decade and through much of the 1980s, when inflation raged across much of the world.

Even through much of the 1990s and early 2000s, 10-20 per cent of countries worldwide experienced a large currency depreciation or crash in any given year.

Excluding the mayhem associated with the global financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, currency crashes were few and far between from 2004 to 2014. But recent developments suggest that the dearth of currency crashes during that decade may be remembered as the exception that proves the rule.

When it comes to sovereign debt, the term “default” is often misunderstood. It almost never entails the complete and permanent repudiation of the entire stock of debt; indeed, even some Tsarist-era Russian bonds were eventually (if only partly) repaid after the 1917 revolution.

Rather, non-payment — a “default”, according to credit-rating agencies, when it involves private creditors — typically spurs a conversation about debt restructuring, which can involve maturity extensions, coupon-payment cuts, grace periods or face-value reductions (so-called “haircuts”).

The details may change, but the global commodity super-cycle follows a familiar pattern. The question now is: Has the ongoing commodity-price downturn run its course, or will the recent break soon be giving way to another drop?

As central bankers and finance ministers gather for the IMF’s annual meetings in Lima, the emerging world is rife with symptoms of increasing economic vulnerability. Some of those symptoms, like slowing growth, are obvious and quantifiable; others, however, are dangerous partly because they are difficult to discern.

Inflation was the theme of this year’s international conference of central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. But, while policymakers are right to prepare for future risks to price stability, they did not place these concerns in the context of recent inflation developments at the global level – or within historical perspective.

Venezuela is a major oil-exporting economy that is so badly mismanaged that real (inflation-adjusted) per capita GDP today is 2% lower than it was in 1970, despite a ten-fold increase in oil prices. And now its president is lashing out at academics who have the temerity to point that out.