Nine foreign policy experts—Nicholas Burns, Chuck Freilich, Orde Kittrie, Martin Malin, Gary Samore, Michael Singh,Ariane Tabatabai, Will Tobey, and Mark Wallace—write on what they believe the extension of P5+1 talks will mean for the future of nuclear negotiations with Iran. 

"Israel's options are limited. Given the failure of the recent negotiations, there is no short-term diplomatic option. Israel cannot tolerate the current situation, but past experience demonstrates that even a major military operation will at most buy a temporary respite before the next round."

"For decades, the United States was a leading player in the region and the primary stabilizer. Today, following its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, compounded by the mishandling of regional developments since the onset of the 'Arab Spring', its regional influence is now at a decades-long nadir. This is not irreversible, but will require years to reverse and will severely impede its ability to influence events in the meantime."

"Netanyahu, however, went too far, criticizing the administration's approach for months and then strongly condemning the interim agreement, rather than working quietly to ensure that the potential downsides were minimized. In so doing he has managed to marginalize Israel on this issue and it is hardly a factor in the conduct of the negotiations."

"The Jews' right to a nation-state was recognized by the League of Nations and United Nations. Israel is and always will be the nation-state of the Jewish people. That is its raison d'être, and it is high time that the Palestinians reconcile themselves to this."

"Relations with authoritarian regimes have long posed a deep dilemma for American policy, between US strategic interests and the exigencies of realpolitik—the need to deal with the world as it is, not as we want it to be—and America's democratic ideals. In the pursuit of the former, the US has long supported numerous heinous regimes, none more so than the Saudi oil theocracy, or South Korea and South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s."

"By the very nature of compromise agreements, no side achieves all of its objectives. The danger is that by insisting on our maximum position, a complete elimination of the nuclear program, we will fail to achieve that which is feasible—freezing and rolling back the program and keeping it under inspection."

"Israel's focus over the coming months, however, should be on an attempt to conduct an intensive and discrete dialogue with the United States and other powers involved, to ensure that the final agreement is the best one possible, given the circumstances. Unfortunately, there will not be a knockout blow and Israel will probably have to continue living with an ongoing, if greatly diminished, Iranian threat. Not the outcome we sought, but apparently better than the alternatives."

"Netanyahu’s hard line is thus both understandable and at least partly justified, but his harsh criticism of the agreement ('a historic mistake') has been too strident, positioning Israel to look as the primary opponent of the agreement and exposing a rift with its irreplaceable ally, the United States. Moreover, in so blatantly positioning himself in opposition, he has probably undermined his own most important objective at this time—ensuring that the final agreement is the best deal possible."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has some legitimate concerns about an interim deal, but his extreme opposition to a deal is hard to understand even from an Israeli perspective. Netanyahu's focus now should be on ensuring a final agreement produces the best possible outcome for Israel, though not through an open confrontation with the United States.