5 Items

teaser image

Paper - Institute for Nuclear Materials Management

IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225): The Next Generation

In 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released the fifth revision of its Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. This update of IAEA nuclear security guidance was a significant improvement upon its predecessors, suggesting new and strengthened approaches to nuclear security in a range of areas. Nearly a decade later, however, the global nuclear security landscape has changed. Nuclear security regulations and practices have improved. International institutions and norms supporting global nuclear security architecture are stronger. Countries have made new political commitments to strengthening their nuclear security. Legally binding agreements are more widely subscribed than they were before. Meanwhile, new global threats have surfaced, presenting new challenges to physical protection systems. A range of emerging technologies creates new opportunities, but also new risks.

The Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in 2010 (Chuck Kennedy/White House via Flickr).

Chuck Kennedy/White House via Flickr

Journal Article - Nonproliferation Review

Nuclear Security in Russia: Can Progress Be Sustained?

| May 08, 2018

Nuclear security in Russia has continued to evolve since the suspension of nearly all US–Russian nuclear-security cooperation in 2014, but the United States and the rest of the world now know much less about the directions of this evolution. This article assesses the current state of nuclear security in Russia based on an examination of key drivers of Russia’s nuclear-security system, from allocation of resources to regulatory oversight. It then outlines four scenarios for the future of evolution of nuclear security in Russia, describing potential causes, implications, and observable indicators for each scenario. It closes with recommendations designed to maximize the chance of moving onto a path of continuous improvement of nuclear security.

teaser image

Paper - Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

Corrupting Nuclear Security: Potential Gaps and New Approaches to Insider Risk Mitigation

| July 2015

This paper offers an overview of the conceptual linkages between nuclear security and corruption and presents a brief review of experience from the realms of nuclear non-proliferation, breaches of highly sensitive national security information, and high-value thefts and heists. It then offers a preliminary assessment of the degree to which current approaches to anti-corruption and human reliability successfully address corruption risks, particularly in the nuclear security context. This paper’s findings establish a need for additional research on how anti-corruption and nuclear security human reliability programs could more clearly, consistently, and proactively scrutinize and dis-incentivize behaviors that present increased risks of corruption.

teaser image


Approaches to Design Basis Threat in Russia in the Context of Significant Increase of Terrorist Activity

| 13-17 July, 2003

Design Basis Threat is one of the main factors to be taken into account during design of physical protection system of nuclear facility. In according with IAEA’s recommendations outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” Design Basis Threat (DBT) defined as: “the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage, against which a physical protection system is designed and evaluated”. Development of DBT is considered as one of the significant task during the work on domestic Russian regulations in the field of physical protection.