As the shouting about the interim deal has subsided, the analytical community has begun examining more carefully the details of what was agreed—and what was left out. Because the Iranian nuclear challenge is inherently so complex and involves inescapable technicalities that really matter, translating the sometimes mind-numbing details of SWUs, centrifuge operating efficiencies, and units of UF6 or oxide into criteria that are understandable for policymakers and critics is demanding. 

Following up on our inaugural posts last week on the Belfer Center's Iran Matters website, we have again gathered several more “best analyses” that advance the arguments for and against the interim agreement with Iran.  The views we cite include perspectives from Iran as well as from the United States.

Gary Samore is the executive director for research at the Belfer Center. Prior to that, he served for four years as President Obama’s White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, including as U.S. Sherpa for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Korea.

We asked him for about prospects for breakthroughs with Iran and Syria, and his goals for the Belfer Center.

The debate on the interim nuclear deal continues—indeed, it approaches avalanche. While the majority of the analytical community appears to be giving the deal at least a conditional thumbs up considering the alternatives, a number of contrary voices have continued to advance relevant considerations. This is our selection of the best for and against the interim agreement.

The Geneva interim agreement is intended to create political time and space to negotiate a final agreement within six months. However, the P5+1 and Iran remain far apart on the central issue of the negotiations – whether Iran can possess the physical capacity to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons as part of its “peaceful” nuclear program. Since this issue is so divisive and intractable, a final settlement in six months is unlikely. Instead – in the interests of keeping the process alive and avoiding the consequences of diplomatic stalemate or collapse – the P5+1 and Iran are likely to conclude another interim deal, which extends negotiations for a final agreement and hopefully includes additional nuclear constraints in exchange for additional sanctions relief. This is probably the best outcome that diplomacy can offer. 

Iran Matters provides a one-stop shop for best analysis, and best facts about the core issues of the Iranian nuclear challenge. Harvard’s Belfer Center’s panel of experts, co-chaired by Graham Allison and Gary Samore, will provide regular updates identifying what the panel judges best analyses for competing answers to core questions. The question for today: how to assess the interim agreement, signed on Sunday with Iran? Thumbs up or thumbs down? In this post, we identify some of the best analyses for both sides.

Even as this paper was being written and edited, U.S.-Russian relations have warmed and chilled. Today, as we are about to go to press, marks a particularly chilly period in recent history, with the cancellation of a planned Moscow Summit in September 2013. To some, this cold spell might signal an inapt moment to consider issues related to transcending mutual deterrence. Such a view would overlook the aims of the paper, which attempts to assess the central and enduring interests of the United States and Russia, the extent to which they coincide or conflict, and whether or not in light of these interests mutual deterrence should remain a fundamental feature of the relationship.

Gary Samore, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs's Executive Director for Research, spoke on a panel entitled "Iran: Crossing the Red Line?" at the Aspen Security Forum in July of 2013.

The videotaped discussion is available here.

What is the value of nongovernment organizations, both in the academy and think tank worlds, to government policymakers? How are such outsiders useful (or not) to policymakers and what can be done to make them more useful? I’ve considered these questions from all three sides—as a government official, foundation funder, and think tanker. Most recently, from 2009 to 2013, I served as a political appointee, as President Obama’s White House coordinator for arms control, nonproliferation, and WMD terrorism, and now I’m back on the outside as executive director for research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.

The Belfer Center hosted a half-day conference on March 23, 2017, gathering a group of top-level American and Japanese academics to discuss the US-Japan alliance and the rise of China. The event was well attended by scholars and students of Harvard and nearby universities, including a large group of scholars from the US Naval War College. Other notable attendees included policy officials as well as members of the Japanese Consulate in Boston.