6 Items

Blog Post - Iran Matters

How to Manage Saudi Anger at the Iran Nuclear Deal

| June 01, 2015

Gene Gerzhoy, Research Fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in the Washington Post that history demonstrates that the United States has many options for both pursuing diplomacy with adversaries while preventing nervous allies from seeking nuclear deterrents of their own, a dilemma the U.S. faces now in its relations with Saudi Arabia over the nuclear negotiations with Iran. He argues that in the 1960s the United States was able to use coercive diplomacy to pressure West Germany to not pursue nuclear weapons by threatening to withdraw American troops helping defend West Germany from the Soviet Union. He suggests that the U.S. could use a combination of coercive pressure and security reassurances to prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring nuclear capabilities after the signing of a nuclear deal with Iran.

Analysis & Opinions - The Washington Post

How to Manage Saudi Anger at the Iran Nuclear Deal

| May 22, 2015

MTA/ISP Research Fellow Gene Gerzhoy argues that the United States should leverage Saudi Arabia’s dependence on U.S. military support to keep it from pursuing nuclear weapons. Using the example of West Germany during the Cold War, he states that the threat of military embargo combined with corresponding security assurances will convince Saudi Arabia to support U.S. diplomacy with Iran.

President John F. Kennedy arrived on June 23, 1963 at the airport in Cologne-Wahn for a four day visit to Germany. In front, chancellor Konrad Adenauer.


Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

| Spring 2015

A prominent model of nuclear proliferation posits that a powerful patron state can prevent a weaker ally from proliferating by providing it with security guarantees. The history of West Germany's pursuit of the bomb from 1954 to 1969 suggests that a patron may also need to threaten the client state with military abandonment to convince it not to acquire nuclear weapons.