Hassan Abbas, PhD, research fellow with the Project on India and the Subcontinent, is a former Pakistani government official. Here he offers analysis on the significance of the Pakistan elections.

"Gilani is leader of a coalition government with a strong mandate but facing difficult problems. It is also committed to policies that could cause turbulence, particularly reinstating judges deposed by President Pervez Musharraf. Gilani's position is further complicated by political circumstances, with the leaders of the dominant parties in the ruling coalition directing policy from outside parliament."

"The primary mission of intelligence services in a modern democratic state is to collect, analyze, evaluate, and pass on foreign intelligence to the government to assist it in making decisions related to national security. Their standard task also includes producing a range of studies that cover virtually any topic of interest to national-security policymakers. Depending on the resources, they use electronic means as well as human sources and, if necessary, undertake covert actions at the direction of the chief executive. A covert action is defined as an act to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, while keeping in view some ethical considerations. Counter-intelligence operations mainly work to guard against espionage from foreign intelligence agencies in the country. They are also expected to effectively protect the secrets of its sources and methods. The role of intelligence services is to only report information and analysis and not to make policy recommendations."

"...Besides leading to bad governance and a deplorable law and order situation in the country, police failures also have compounded the threat of religious extremism and terrorism. Poor data collection on crime and criminals and inadequate analytical capabilities hamper effective law enforcement. In many instances, banned militant organisations continued with their publications and in some cases wanted criminals, and terrorists changed their party affiliations (hurriedly joining groups that were not under government scrutiny after theirs were banned) and the police remained clueless. Here the police was also handicapped as many militant groups were producing "freedom fighters" for Kashmir and Afghanistan and had working relations with the intelligences services, and hence police officials were reluctant to go after some of these elements thinking that they might be the assets of some "other state institution." Things are reported to be progressively changing in this sphere lately, but the serious challenge remains...."

On February 18, Pakistanis voted in parliamentary elections. The results were a major blow to President Pervez Musharraf and his supporters. Opposition parties, led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and a resurgent Awami National Party (ANP), scored major victories. The prime losers were the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) and Islamists. How can these elections be assessed, and what do they portend for Pakistan’s future and for U.S. policy? These questions were examined at an Asia Program event held one week after the elections.

"The Pakistani Army positively contributed towards the holding of free elections on Feb 18, but it cannot be expected to do the job of law enforcement endlessly. Dependence on the military for such tasks ultimately persuades its leadership to increase the army’s involvement in the political domain, and in the process that follows such thinking, Pakistan loses many years. Generals like Waheed Kakar and Jahangir Karamat are rare, and given some recent developments it seems that Pakistan is lucky to have another of their kind in the form of the new chief, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. This golden opportunity should not be lost (like before) to nurture and groom civilian institutions to stand on their own feet."

"As for Musharraf, he is living in a fool's paradise if he thinks he is going to be a father figure to the next prime minister of Pakistan. The new government will be under tremendous public pressure to bring back the deposed judges, and that could sound a death knell for the Musharraf presidency. For the army, which is distancing itself from Musharraf already, institutional interests, saving prestige and influence, will be more important than rescuing a president who continues to shoot himself in the foot. The west in general — and Britain and the US in particular — must show patience while democratic forces settle; at least as much patience as they showed with military dictators. This is the very least that the people of Pakistan earned yesterday."

"While there is a considerable risk that the elections will be rigged and that poor security will deter voting, pro-Musharraf parties will be swept from power. The PPP is expected to secure the most votes, raising the prospect of a grand coalition of parties united in opposition to the president. Stable government will depend on their ability to work together, as well as with Musharraf, for as long as he remains in power."

"The organizational strength, military strategy and leadership quality of the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal territories has qualitatively improved during the last few years. At the time of the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan in late 2001, allies and sympathizers of the Taliban in Pakistan were not identified as 'Taliban' themselves. That reality is now a distant memory. Today, Pakistan's indigenous Taliban are an effective fighting force and are engaging the Pakistani military on one side and NATO forces on the other."

"...Pakistan has lost a desperately needed leader. With Pakistan's future in the balance, the West's help and support will be crucial, but that means recognising that Musharraf is not the only leader who can resolve Pakistan's many problems and manage the war on terror. On the contrary, by nurturing the present environment of instability and uncertainty, Musharraf himself must be regarded as one of Pakistan's biggest problems."