In its new “Say More” newsletter, Project Syndicate interviewed Jeffrey Frankel about the recent U.S. decision to label China a "currency manipulator" which has been roundly criticized. 

The trade war between the United States and China is heating up again, with U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly announcing plans to impose a 10-per-cent tariff on the US$300-billion worth of imports from China that he had so far left untouched. The Chinese authorities then allowed their currency, the renminbi, to fall below the symbolic threshold of seven yuan for every U.S. dollar. The Trump administration promptly responded by naming China a “currency manipulator” – the first time the U.S. had done that to any country in 25 years. Pundits declared a currency war, and investors immediately sent global stock markets lower.

The US-China trade war heated up in the first week of August.  On August 1, Donald Trump abruptly announced plans to impose a 10 % tariff on the remaining $300 billion of imports from China that he had not already hit with earlier tariffs.   The Chinese authorities then allowed their currency, the renminbi (RMB), to fall in value below the highly visible line of 7.0 RMB/$.  The US Administration promptly reacted on August 5 by naming China a “currency manipulator” — the first time any country had been given that designation in 25 years.   Pundits declared a currency war, while investors responded by immediately sending stock markets down.

The Fed has some reasons for cutting interest rates at its meeting July 31, or subsequently if the US economy weakens. (And there are some good arguments on the other side as well, if growth remains as strong as it has been over the last year.)  But I find less persuasive one argument for easing: a perceived imperative to get inflation up to 2.0% or higher.

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke set a 2% target for the US inflation rate in January 2012.  Some other countries had already done the same.  Japan followed suit a year later. Indeed Shinzo Abe’s successful accession to prime minister in late 2012 was predicated on the promise that monetary policy would raise inflation (Japan having previously suffered from negative inflation).

The United States Federal Reserve has some reasons to cut interest rates at its July 31 meeting, or subsequently if the U.S. economy weakens. (There is also a case for holding rates steady, if growth remains as strong as it has been over the past year.) But one argument for easing is less persuasive: a perceived imperative to get U.S. inflation up to or above 2 per cent.

Here in Cambridge, we are reeling from the passing of Martin Feldstein on Tuesday. He was tremendously influential both as scholar and teacher.  He was also a  policy-maker:  Below, the last section of this remembrance offers some recollections of his time as Chairman of Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers.

Donald Trump on May 5 suddenly revealed that a trade agreement with China was not imminent after all.  To the contrary, the Administration on May 10 raised its earlier 10 percent tariff on $200 billion of Chinese goods to 25%, and threatened to extend 25% tariffs to the remainder of imports from China by late June (roughly $300 billion of goods).  China, of course, retaliated against US exports [announcing reciprocal 25% tariffs on $60 billion of US goods, to start June 1.  Surprised stock markets fell in response, with the S&P 500 down 4 per cent over the first week of the renewed trade war.

The mystery is why market investors or anyone else had up until May put faith in White House statements that a deal with China was expected any day.  Why believe this Administration on such a thing? Trump, after all, is the guy who, after meeting with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, claimed that North Korea was no longer a problem because it had agreed to denuclearization. And the guy who said that Saudi officials had promised him to buy $110 billion of US arms and to lower oil prices. Did anyone really expect a proud China to agree, without meaningful reciprocal concessions, to let the US write some of its laws and to pass subsequent unilateral judgment on whether it was complying?

Whereas winners tend to outnumber losers when trade is liberalized, raising tariffs normally has the opposite result. US President Donald Trump appears to have engineered a spectacular example of this: his trade war with China has hurt almost every segment of the US economy, and created very few winners.

A century ago, the gold standard was considered a guarantor of monetary stability.  That golden era is long-gone.  (If it every really existed at all.  The general price level fell 53% in US and 45% in the UK during 1873-1896 due to a dearth of gold deposit discoveries.)

Continuing my thoughts on the Fed candidacy of Stephen Moore: he has said several times that he favors a return to gold.  In true Trumpian fashion, he recently denied having said it despite the clear video evidence.

A century ago, the gold standard was considered a guarantor of monetary stability.  That golden era is long-gone.  (If it ever really existed at all.  The general price level fell 53% in US and 45% in the UK during 1873-1896 due to a dearth of gold deposit discoveries.)

Continuing my thoughts on the Fed candidacy of Stephen Moore: he has said several times that he favors a return to gold.  In true Trumpian fashion, he recently denied having said it despite the clear video evidence.