According to the "Madman Theory" outlined by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas C. Schelling, and embraced by Presidents Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, being perceived as mad can help make seemingly incredible threats—such as starting a nuclear war—more credible. However, recent research has largely concluded that the Madman Theory does not work. 

Divestment is a prominent strategy championed by activists to induce positive social change. For example, the current fossil fuel divestment movement includes over 1,500 institutions that control $40 trillion in assets. A primary pathway through which divestment is theorized to be effective is by influencing public beliefs and policy preferences, thus pressuring policymakers to take action. However, prior research only tests this argument via qualitative case studies. The authors assess the impact of exposure to information about fossil fuel divestment on public opinion through the use of national survey experiments in three major greenhouse gas emitters: the U.S., India, and South Africa.

Do armed drone programs decrease or increase terrorism? Existing studies on this question produce conflicting arguments and evidence. Drone optimists contend that armed drones reduce a country's vulnerability to terrorism, while pessimists claim that this military technology provokes higher levels of terrorism. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on one particular context: the short-term effect of the US drone program in Pakistan. However, armed drones have proliferated rapidly over the last decade and eighteen countries now possess this technology. The authors expand the scope of prior studies by leveraging new data to assess how obtaining armed drones and conducting drone strikes changed the degree to which all drone possessors experienced terrorism between 2001 and 2019.

Joshua A. Schwartz and Matthew Fuhrmann ask: Do armed drone operations reduce terrorism, or do they actually make countries more vulnerable to it?

Joshua Schwartz and Sabrina Arias write that although Congress seems unable to act, enough states, cities and counties are mobilizing to make a dent in U.S. carbon emissions. The states, cities, counties, and towns that have committed themselves to upholding the Paris agreement currently release a majority of U.S. carbon emissions. If they do manage to meet their targets, they can make a meaningful difference.

The authors write that norms can change. This process by which a norm dies often occurs in the wake of security shocks. Just as 9/11 motivated the George W. Bush administration to erode the anti-torture norm, a future security shock could prompt the United States to violate its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The authors' findings advance a specific debate on the strength of weapons taboos, while their conceptualization of insincere norm-holders and methodological application have broader implications for how scholars might think about and measure norms in international politics.