How does the IAEA reach the conclusion that a state is in "non-compliance" with safeguards and thereby alert the international community to the possibility that the state is (or was) seeking to acquire nuclear weapons? This seminar will examine how the IAEA has drawn safeguards conclusions in past cases. It will recommend modifications to the IAEA's reporting procedures to enhance the credibility of its safeguards conclusions and improve opportunities for the timely resolution of compliance issues.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for verifying the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials and facilities in almost every state in the world.  With well over 1000 nuclear facilities to safeguard, and only a limited budget with which to do it, how does the IAEA decide where to focus its attention?  In this MTA seminar, Stanton Nuclear Security Research Fellow Kalman Robertson will explain how the IAEA allocates its safeguards resources among states and how this may be changing as the IAEA develops its “state level concept” for safeguards.