"Despite the increased controversy regarding the causes of 9/11, President Ahmadinejad's active presence in New York was another step toward a greater proximity between the conflicting visions currently dividing Iran and the United States. This may leave its mark on the forthcoming nuclear negotiations. Instead of over-emphasizing on general and international issues, Iran should focus on an accommodating role to solve regional issues which have international dimensions."

"...[W]hile the traditional form of balance of power between Iran and Iraq provided security for the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, it favored the interests of foreign actors, especially the United States. Proponents of such a view hold that following the overthrow of the Baathist regime in Iraq and the growth of Iran's role and influence in the region, the international community ought to establish a new kind of balance of power to restrain the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby preserve the security of the region. Following its failure to redefine the position of the new Iraq in terms of a new balance of power, the United States has itself tried to play such a role in the region. U.S. efforts to minimize Iran's role within the context of the new balance of power have consequently created another security dilemma in the Persian Gulf."

"Russia will, of course, endeavor to be the sole supplier of nuclear fuel to Iran and reap the benefits. Therefore, it will continue to support the west's most recent line i.e. that with Bushehr's launching Iran does not require independent enrichment facilities like Natanz. But strategic necessity will force Russia to continue to maintain Iran as counterweight in its relations with the West."

"Yet, direct strategic talks do not necessarily mean renewed friendship between Tehran and Washington; rather they imply the persuasion of each side to acknowledge the other's role and to reach a compromise on the issue of cohabitation in a region where both have vital national and security interests. Both sides would conclude that continuing in a permanent condition of mutual hostility can only inflict greater damage to their national interests. This would entail an exit from the current state of confrontation to interaction or constructive rivalry, in order to maintain their regional interests. For instance, direct talks between the United States and communist China in 1972 did not result in a friendship."

"...[S]ince sanctions and economic constraints will directly impact ordinary Iranians, they will intensify the current sense of distrust towards the West and especially the United States in all political trends and people, subsequently resulting in national mobilization and unity, thereby strengthening the hand of the Iranian government to resist the sanctions. This is the complete opposite of the result desired by the West."

"When the nuclear swap proposal was initially presented by the IAEA and the West in October 2009, it was broached by the disparate political organs of Iran's power structure. The embodiment of Iran’s strategic decision was the acceptance of the Tehran Nuclear Deal in May 2010. Although Washington has rejected the Tehran Deal on the basis of its own narrow reasons i.e., Iran has increased its enriched uranium stockpile within the last few months rendering the swap deal useless, one should accept that Tehran needed some time to weigh up the Geneva Deal on the domestic political scene."

"...[R]ising regional powers such as Turkey and Brazil can fulfill the role of active partners and help bridge the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two sides; Iran and 5+1. These actors' perspectives on issues such as international peace and security, comprehensive global disarmament and nuclear monopolies have many supporters in the international community, especially among the Non-Aligned Movement's members, who are fed up with duplicity and self-aggrandizing policies of some of the great powers."

"In today's world, nations' access to middle or advanced range technologies such as car industries or nuclear technology, their increased national defensive and deterrent capabilities and thus their more regional political and economic clout, enable them to sway more influence on international and regional public opinion, and thereby express their ways of progress and national confidence. This can challenge the hegemony and power monopoly of great powers such as the United States and pave the way for creating new opportunities to establish regional coalitions by rising states."

"...President Ahmadinejad's attendance at the review conference proves that Iran is interested in initiating dialogue with the United States and endeavors to seize every opportunity to advance the course of dialogue. After the conference, President Ahmadinejad engaged in several interviews with leading media networks and stressed Iran's interest in advancing direct talks with the United States. By connecting directly to the American public, he managed to effectively preempt the negative and misleading propaganda purveyed by Western officials and the media, claiming Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA, and he furthermore reiterated Iran's interest in a uranium swap deal."

"A powerful Iranian government with a national security agenda would be able to initiate direct talks with the United States, resulting in workable and tangible solutions. As is the case in the United States, the issue of direct talks is heavily influenced by domestic politics in Iran. Only a national security issue such as the nuclear program with the negotiation of a grand bargain would have the impetus and public support for initiation of a bilateral strategic dialogue. Creating political consensus among the elites is key to any possible future opening up or progress on the nuclear and various other geo-strategically pertinent fronts."