"The second perspective focuses on the globalization and technological importance of the West, arguing that in the process of globalization and development, Iran needs expanding ties with the centers of science and wealth-creation in the West. From this perspective, forming regional coalitions or Iran's involvement in political and security issues of the Middle East, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, in a contradictory way will only go to further complicate Iran's relations with the West and will impede the country's development."

"...[T]he real solution is for Tehran and Washington to opt for direct diplomacy over the nuclear issue....The Americans too must not overlook the delicate point that if they voluntarily promote the role of China in Iran's nuclear and strategic programs, they would somehow help develop Beijing's strategic role....it would be a strategic blunder for the US to let China get involved in the political and strategic issues of the Middle East."

"Iran's nuclear case is not solely about energy and technology, but is also about national security as well as regional and international strategic policies of Iran. The nuclear program of Iran is potentially capable of providing a ground for bilateral talks between Iran and the United States. The US government should understand that diplomacy and dialogue is the sole way to achieve a solution which would be accepted by both sides. Continuation of pressures and new sanctions will only defer any chance of negotiations for a couple of years."

"The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad's foreign policy and Iran's increasing presence in the region has been offensive, expansionist, opportunistic, and often ideological. Though Iran has occasionally taken advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations have been exaggerated in the United States. Instead, Iran's action should be perceived in a more pragmatic light. Though Ahmadinejad may himself be an ideological and divisive figure, Iran's foreign policy strategy predates him and ought to be viewed as a wider Iranian effort to secure its geostrategic interests and national security concerns. Despite Ahmadinejad's tendencies to indulge his eccentricities, the logic of Iran's foreign policy decisionmaking process always ensures this return to pragmatism."

"Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran's response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran's national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation."

"In the years since the September 11 attacks and the onset of crisis in Iraq, Iran's consolidation of its political-security role in the Middle East, and its impact upon regional and international security systems has been the focus of attention in international and Middle East security studies. The prevailing view in the West and the Arab world is that new political-security and geopolitical developments have changed the balance in regional power and political structure in favor of Iran. Accordingly, this situation has had negative effects on the United States' strategic interests, its regional allies in the Arab world, and on Israel's position. During recent decades, preserving a 'balance of power' policy between the regional actors has been the basis of American foreign policies in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. The recent developments have unbalanced power equations in favor of Iran."

"...[S]ituated in what it sees as a hostile neighborhood, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian government views an independent nuclear fuel cycle as interchangeable with deterrence, rather than as a bid for building a nuclear arsenal. While building a nuclear arsenal would be a costly endeavor, risking international isolation and assuring Iran's 'pariah status,' acquiring civilian nuclear capability would afford Iran the security and psychological edge it has long sought, and at a lower cost."

Research Fellow Kayhan Barzegar describes the four candidates for the Iranian presidency (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohsen Rezai) in terms of their credentials, power base, and stances on domestic politics and foreign policy—including the Iranian nuclear program.

"During the last decades, the hardest and most controversial processes of détente between rival countries like the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China in the 1960s and 1970s occurred after a hard and intense time following the acceptance of 'comparable roles' in talks. Iran's nuclear program can provide a momentous opportunity for Iran-U.S. détente."

"The success of the party of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki in Iraq's provincial elections has been largely perceived as a challenge to Iran. During his campaign, Maliki focused on Iraqi independence, establishing a powerful central government, and taking nationalistic positions with respect to Iraq's domestic and foreign policies. Implementation of these policies, should they lead to the emergence of a modest nationalism, would favor Iran's national security and interests, especially in the advent of U.S. troop withdrawals...."