More than a decade after its nuclear security recommendations first recognized the threat insiders pose to nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has finally released its guide on nuclear material control and accounting for nuclear security.  (This has been in the works for years.) Many people wrongly think that any material under international safeguards has accounting and control good enough for security purposes as well, but there are important differences.

William H. Tobey, Matthew Bunn, and Nickolas Roth oppose proposed legislation that would prohibit funding for fixed radiation detectors to catch nuclear smugglers. They argue for a balanced program to defeat nuclear smuggling that includes strong security, effective law enforcement and intelligence work, and interdiction efforts and border controls backed by both fixed and mobile radiation detectors.

"Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. They do not exist in appreciable quantities in nature and are quite difficult to produce. But with such materials in hand, most states—and potentially even some particularly sophisticated terrorist groups—would be able to make at least a crude nuclear explosive. Hence controlling those materials and the means to make them is a critical element of regulating the path to the bomb..."

The news that an anti-nuclear protester landed a slightly radiation-laced drone on the Japanese Prime Minister’s office building highlights the burgeoning role of drones in debates about nuclear security. Drones can contribute to both threats to nuclear facilities and defenses against those threats.

Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice and Co-Principle Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, is a signatory on the Arms Control Association's statement on the framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. The statement argues the framework released so far is a positive step for nonproliferation, and that it will help put in place the necessary verification and monitoring measures to prevent Iran from racing towards a bomb without detection, and urges support for the finalizing of the agreement.

Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice and Co-Principle Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, writes in The National Interest that if we consider a "good deal" to be an agreement that reduces Iran's chances of building a nuclear bomb more than alternative options, then the current framework announced at Lausanne is a good deal. He argues that the deal includes stringent technical terms that will make any breakout attempt much more detectable, and also notes that politically the deal decrease the immediate military threat to Iran, diminishing the need for a nuclear bomb, while sanctions relief will create economic disincentives to returning to the nuclear confrontation. Finally, he suggests that the alternatives to a deal, such as a return to sanctions and pressure or a military attack, are much less likely at this point of achieving the goal of an Iran without a nuclear weapon.

"...[B]y lifting sanctions, the deal would create a flow of very real benefits to Iran—including to some of the most powerful players in the Iranian regime—which they would not want to put at risk with clandestine bomb efforts....the deal would make clear that compromise with the West that really does contribute to Iran's economic development is possible, strengthening advocates of compromise in Tehran. Finally, the agreement's 10–25 year duration means that, if successful, an entire generation of Iranians will come of age in an era of reduced tension and confrontation with the West—creating new and powerful political constituencies against returning to confrontation on the nuclear issue."

On April 2, 2015, Matthew Bunn presented "The Iranian Nuclear Deal: Benefits and Risks" at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This presentation assess the benefits and risks of the Iranian deal compared to plausible alternatives.

The Secretary of Energy on December 20, 2013 established the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation (TFNN) and charged it to “advise the DOE on future areas of emphasis for its nuclear nonproliferation activities by addressing the following questions:

1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation?

2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet those challenges?

3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation?

4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or expanded?

5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?”

In The Hague, leaders have agreed on a new initiative to secure dangerous radiological sources that might be used in a so-called “dirty bomb” – to prevent incidents like the December 2013 theft of a truck carrying a deadly source in Mexico.