14 Items

French soldiers loading a French Reaper drone with two GBU 12 missiles

Malaury Buis/EMA/DICOD via AP, File

Journal Article - International Studies Quarterly

Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counterproductive? Evidence from Eighteen Countries

Do armed drone programs decrease or increase terrorism? Existing studies on this question produce conflicting arguments and evidence. Drone optimists contend that armed drones reduce a country's vulnerability to terrorism, while pessimists claim that this military technology provokes higher levels of terrorism. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on one particular context: the short-term effect of the US drone program in Pakistan. However, armed drones have proliferated rapidly over the last decade and eighteen countries now possess this technology. The authors expand the scope of prior studies by leveraging new data to assess how obtaining armed drones and conducting drone strikes changed the degree to which all drone possessors experienced terrorism between 2001 and 2019.

A Royal Air Force Reaper RPAS (Remotely Piloted Air System) at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan.

Sergeant Ross Tilly (RAF)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation

Claims that drones will soon remake warfare or international politics are unwarranted. Although almost a dozen states now possess armed drones, and more are racing to acquire them, they will not play a decisive role in interstate conflicts. Drones will rarely be “winning weapons,” because they are vulnerable to air defenses. States will, however, continue to use drones against terrorists and domestic opponents.

The Czech nuclear power plant at Temelin, Apr.29, 2003. Located just 60 km north of the Austrian border, the plant based on Soviet design and upgraded with U.S. technology has been a source of friction between the 2 states.

AP Photo

Analysis & Opinions - Slate

Nuclear Inertia

| April 26, 2011

"Nuclear-reactor construction is dominated by inertia. Harvesting nuclear energy is incredibly expensive at first, but much cheaper once the infrastructure is in place. Nevertheless, countries with a lot of money invested in nuclear energy have been surprisingly reluctant to give it up—even after major nuclear accidents. States that were not heavily invested, however, have often been quick to cancel their nuclear plans after accidents in other countries."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a statement to members of the foreign press in Jerusalem, Jan. 11, 2011. He insisted that Iran will not stop its nuclear program unless economic sanctions are backed with a "credible military option."

AP Photo

Journal Article - The Journal of Strategic Studies

Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

| April 2011

"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Correspondence: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

| Summer 2010

Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Rensselaer Lee, and William Sailor respond to Matthew Fuhrmann's summer 2009 International Security article, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements."

This Aug. 5, 2007 satellite image provided Oct. 25, 2007 by DigitalGlobe shows a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria that Israel's Sep. 6, 2007, raid destroyed.

AP Photo

Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace

| October 2009

When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.

This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.

Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, right sitting, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, left sitting, sign a nuclear cooperation agreement at a ceremony in Rome's Villa Madama residence, Feb. 24, 2009.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

| Summer 2009

Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."

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Journal Article - Journal of Conflict Resolution

Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

| Apr. 01, 2009

Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation," argues that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries. The hypotheses are tested using a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000.