Max Abrahms, and Jonathan Leader Maynard and Kai Thaler respond to Barbara F. Walter's Fall 2017 article, "The Extremist's Advantage in Civil Wars."

The strategic model—the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies—claims that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians to achieve political goals. To defeat terrorism, policymakers have sought to decrease its political utility by adhering to a no concessions policy, engaging in political accommodation, and promoting democracy. The evidence suggests, however, that terrorists are not motivated primarily by a desire to achieve political objectives. Rather, they use terrorism to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Counterterrorism strategies must therefore find ways to diminish the social utility of terrorism.

Terrorism may be a choice method of political coercion at the moment, but this study finds that it is not very successful. Terrorists who attack civilian populations rather than military targets fail to achieve their policy objectives, because countries whose populations are victims of massive terrorist violence are highly unlikely to negotiate, let alone make political concessions, with terrorists whose actions imply that they will not compromise.

William Rose and Rysia Murphy reply to Max Abrahms's fall 2006 International Security article, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."