18 Items

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and China's President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their talks on the sideline of the 11th edition of the BRICS Summit, in Brasilia, Brazil, Wednesday, Nov. 13, 2019.

Ramil Sitdikov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP

Analysis & Opinions - Barron's

Russia and China Are Hard Targets for U.S. Sanctions. That Could Be a Problem.

| Feb. 29, 2020

When wielded effectively, U.S. sanctions have weakened targets like Iran and North Korea without impacting the global economy. But against authoritarian heavyweights like Russia and China, this may no longer be the case. America’s policy options are narrowing.

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Broadcast Appearance - The Brookings Institution

The U.S. Needs Updated Sanctions Programs for an Era of Great Power Competition

| Oct. 14, 2019

In this episode of Dollar & SenseDavid Dollar is joined by Michael Greenwald, a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center who helped design sanctions programs at the U.S. Treasury, to discuss the effectiveness of these tools and why they need to be updated for an era of great power competition.

Stock prices are displayed at the New York Stock Exchange, Wednesday, Sept. 18, 2019.

AP Photo/Mark Lennihan

Analysis & Opinions - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

The Geoeconomic Superstorm Threatening the Globe’s Three Financial Hubs

| Sep. 30, 2019

While New York, London, and Hong Kong will continue to play outsized roles in international business, their current privileged status may be more precarious than it seems.

President Donald Trump, left, poses for a photo with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

AP Photo/Susan Walsh

Analysis & Opinions - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

A Financial Statecraft Strategy for the United States to Address the Rise of China

| July 01, 2019

Washington should adjust its coercive economic strategy to reflect a broader use of tools beyond sanctions. Given the degree of political interference in China’s banking system via formal state ownership and the indirect influence of opaque party committees, penalties imposed against the country’s banks are unlikely to produce a meaningful change in behavior.