China’s maritime neighbors can prevent China from dominating East Asia militarily, allowing the United States to avoid the costs and risks of expanding its forces in the region. These states have developed antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that can deny China command of its near seas. The United States should support these capabilities while taking steps to enhance crisis stability.

As Michael Beckley reveals, the United States' alliance commitments draw it into conflict far less often than many assume.

How often do alliance commitments draw the United States into military conflicts that it might otherwise avoid? An analysis of U.S. conflicts over the past several decades reveals that the number is significantly smaller than many observers assume.

Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson responds to Michael Beckley's winter 2011/12 International Security article, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure."

Two assumptions dominate current debates on US foreign policy toward Pakistan. First, Pakistan shares a robust "all-weather" friendship with China centered on core national interests. Second, Pakistan's ability to turn to China in times of need insulates it from US pressure and renders hardline US policies counterproductive. Both of these assumptions are mistaken.

“Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and non-linear.  In the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States," writes Belfer Center ISP fellow Michael Beckley, "[however] the trends suggest that the United States’ economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded condition that will persist well into this century.”

"Is China becoming a serious economic competitor to the United States? Is China, in effect, a giant Japan?...For many reasons, China is unlikely to repeat Japan's success. Most important, China is developing in a far more challenging international environment than Japan faced in the second half of the 20th century. As a result, its economy will remain more compatible than competitive with America's for the foreseeable future."

"China narrowed the gap in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and will likely overtake the United States as the world's largest economy sometime between 2015 and 2040. What matters for national power, however, is not gross wealth, but net wealth—the wealth left over after people are clothed and fed. China's 1.3 billion people produce a large volume of output, but they also consume most of it immediately, leaving little left over for national purposes."

The current hype that China is overtaking the United States is wrong. China is rising, but it is not catching up. Globalization and hegemony, often considered burdens, are actually helping the United States maintain its edge by allowing it to reap financial advantages and manipulate the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and pursue a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.

Much has been made of the rise of China's economy, and some fear that China will surpass the United States as the world's largest economy in the coming years. Michael Beckley goes against the grain, arguing that the size of a nation's economy doesn't necessarily dictate its global power, and that the United States is not in great danger because of China's economic developments.