"Today and tomorrow, world leaders will gather for what will likely be the final international summit on security for nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them—a key tool for preventing nuclear terrorism. The last time this group met, at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague, they declared that preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials remained “one of the most important challenges in the years to come.” Yet, since then, nuclear security has improved only marginally, while the capabilities of some terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State, have grown dramatically, suggesting that in the net, the risk of nuclear terrorism may be higher than it was two years ago..."

The history of nuclear security has been described as an example of “punctuated equilibrium” -- long periods of inaction and complacency followed by events that catalyze action. U.S. history is rife with examples where the discovery of vulnerabilities or major incidents led agencies to strengthen nuclear security requirements.

"World leaders face a stark choice at the final Nuclear Security Summit later this week: Will they commit to efforts that continue to improve security for nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and nuclear facilities, or will the 2016 summit be seen in retrospect as the point at which attention drifted elsewhere, and nuclear security stalled and began to decline? The answer will shape the chances that terrorist groups, including the Islamic State, could get their hands on the materials they need to build a crude nuclear bomb...."

The history of nuclear security has been described as one of punctuated equilibrium, long periods of inaction and complacency followed by events that catalyze action. U.S. history is rife with examples where the discovery of vulnerabilities or major incidents led to the strengthening of nuclear security requirements.

In this new report, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?, Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William Tobey provide a global reality check on nuclear security. They note that effective and sustainable nuclear security capable of addressing plausible threats is the single most effective chokepoint preventing terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Congress has released its Omnibus appropriation bill for funding the entire government, including National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear non-proliferation and security programs. The following is a snapshot of the fiscal year 2016 request and Congressional appropriation process, as well as charts providing some context about what these numbers mean.  This non-proliferation budget is the last that will be fully executed by the Obama administration.

"One category of nuclear material that has not yet been adequately addressed throughout recent Nuclear Security Summits is military stockpiles.2 Instead, the Summit process has focused primarily on reducing the risk of civilian nuclear material theft..."

Are nuclear sites secure?  There are some who might assume the answer is yes and that we should not worry about the possibility of nuclear bomb material being stolen. Yet, recent history has repeatedly demonstrated that high security facilities thought to be secure were actually vulnerable. Two such incidents last month illustrated this idea.

This paper offers an overview of the conceptual linkages between nuclear security and corruption and presents a brief review of experience from the realms of nuclear non-proliferation, breaches of highly sensitive national security information, and high-value thefts and heists. It then offers a preliminary assessment of the degree to which current approaches to anti-corruption and human reliability successfully address corruption risks, particularly in the nuclear security context. This paper’s findings establish a need for additional research on how anti-corruption and nuclear security human reliability programs could more clearly, consistently, and proactively scrutinize and dis-incentivize behaviors that present increased risks of corruption.

This chapter assesses whether terrorists are actually seeking nuclear weapons; whether a terrorist organization could, if it had the needed nuclear materials, be capable of building a nuclear bomb; whether terrorist organizations could plausibly get the needed nuclear materials; and what the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack might be. The chapter then describes the substantial progress made in reducing the risk of nuclear theft in recent years and the gaps that still remain. Finally, the chapter offers suggestions for strengthening nuclear security for the long haul.