As of April 2016, there are growing indications that North Korea has separated, is separating, or will soon be separating plutonium from irradiated fuel at the Radiochemical Laboratory, a process commonly referred to as reprocessing. An analysis of recent satellite imagery obtained shows several activities, which could be correlated to the preparation or actual reprocessing activities underway.

Olli Heinonen is of the opinion that the first report that the UN nuclear watchdog presented about Iran’s nuclear program after the implementation of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) was expected to be more detailed in order to reach a “broader conclusion”.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s most recent report on Iran’s nuclear activities provides insufficient details on important verification and monitoring issues. Over the longer term, this will hamper efforts to reach a “broader conclusion” that all nuclear material and activities are accounted for and for peaceful use.

For more than three years, members of the bipartisan Iran Study Group have convened regularly under the auspices of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy to discuss the status of the Iran nuclear issue, frequently benefitting from the input of senior administration officials. Last June, with the target date looming for completion of the nuclear talks, members of the group issued a statement offering their consensus view on aspects of those negotiations and on broader U.S. Middle East policy. As the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) now moves into a new phase with Implemen- tation Day, members of the group believe it is timely and appropriate to issue this new consensus statement on U.S. policy. The Belfer Center's Olli Heinonen joined the Iran Study Group to produce the attached detailed statement.

Implementation Day marked the beginning of the true test of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The success of the JCPOA in containing Iran’s nuclear capabilities depends on full transparency and vigorous verification and monitoring. While the JCPOA caps Tehran’s nuclear capabilities in the early years, the deal may, over the long term, contribute to a proliferation cascade that will make the world’s most volatile region all the more combustible.

The Iran nuclear deal was officially implemented on Saturday, as Iran successfully fulfilled its initial key nuclear commitments and the international community relieved major sanctions, including unfreezing about $100 billion of Iranian money. Implementation Day was met with applause from deal supporters in the U.S. and Iran, while critics have raised questions about whether Iran will adhere to its requirements and how it will flex its newfound economic power. Also in recent days, the U.S. and Iran agreed to a prisoner swap that led to the freedom of Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian and others, and negotiated the release of American sailors detained in Iran. What does the arrival of Implementation Day mean for Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear nonproliferation, and how does it bode for the future of U.S.-Iran relations? We asked Belfer Center experts to weigh in on these and related questions.

When the new report is brought before the IAEA’s Board of Governors on December 15, it should adopt a resolution based on: a credible baseline for monitoring and verification; assurances, with high confidence, that all weapons-related activities have been terminated; and future sampling and investigations carried out in-situ by IAEA inspectors and experts.

Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes that despite the general lack of cooperation from Iran, the IAEA has produced a successful comprehensive report detailing Iran's nuclear activities. However he notes that Iran's noncompliance has hampered the final determinations, and so further investigation and intelligence operations should be conducted to determine the extent of Iranian nuclear activity.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) puts Iran’s nuclear program under greater scrutiny than before and reduces the likelihood of an overt dash to the bomb for the next 10 years. But the agreement contains a number of notable weaknesses—particularly regarding undeclared nuclear activity and weapons- related research—that should be mitigated by adopting stronger verification measures.