Senior fellow Olli Heinonen delivered the keynote speech at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency International Forum on ongoing proliferation concerns and the future of Japan's nuclear policy.

This policy brief argues that, on balance, a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone would be better off relying on IAEA verification and safeguards at the beginning. Over the medium- to longer- term, given the political will, financial, and human resources, the regional states could invest in a regional authority to build up their own capacity and thereby contribute to strengthening mutual confidence and trust.

While the purpose of multilateral negotiations with Iran is to reduce proliferation concerns, successful talks may in fact accelerate nuclear plans in the Gulf states and Jordan, writes Senior Fellow Olli Heinonen.

This proliferation-sensitive procurement architecture should remain in place for the duration of the comprehensive agreement. The six powers must carefully plan for eventualities now and design and implement an architecture that prevents future Iranian illicit procurements under a comprehensive agreement.

Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are continuing negotiations to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Whilst the wider political context to such an agreement is of importance, the key concern at this stage of the negotiations must revolve around ensuring that any agreement guarantees Iran is left without a pathway to making nuclear weapons.

In a recent appearance in Washington, DC, the IAEA’s Director General Yukiya Amano repeatedly emphasized that the military nuclear issues need to be addressed and solved. It is time for the IAEA to chart a new course before its lack of progress in resolving this issue collides with the effort by the world’s powers and Iran to achieve a nuclear deal by November 24. The IAEA, with the support of the United States, must act quickly.

Improvements to the current methods used by nuclear industry to track and  identify uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders would benefit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nuclear inspectorates, and regulatory authorities, as well as facility operators. A move towards a standardized UF6 cylinder identifier is gaining momentum within industry. A National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) team has analyzed how a cylinder identification and monitoring system could be useful to IAEA safeguards and has also engaged industry stakeholders to seek feedback on concepts related to unique cylinder identification and monitoring. While industry initiative is central to developing a system for identifying UF6 cylinders, the IAEA has been monitoring the maturation of identification/tracking technologies in support of possible safeguards use at facilities at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Olli Heinonen argues for putting Iran's ballistic missiles on the table in nuclear negotiations. Leaving concerns about Iran's nuclear delivery systems unaddressed, he argues, would weaken any safeguard and verification regime in a possible comprehensive nuclear deal.

Olli Heinonen examines Iran's plan for future civil nuclear power generation. Iran, Heinonen points out, lacks the domestic uranium resources to fuel the proposed reactors self-sufficiently. Therefore, he argues, Iran needs to be realistic in planning its civilian nuclear future.

In my testimony, I will focus on the verification aspects of elements needed in a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran, which is being negotiated as a next stage to the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) concluded in Geneva on 24 November 2013.