The death from natural causes of an old man in North Korea this month should have been the closing chapter of the tale of Pakistan's nuclear and missile cooperation with the Hermit Kingdom. Instead, it may mark the next episode in the saga of Iran's controversial nuclear program.

The recent negotiations in Vienna have shown that the principles driving the positions of the “The Six”--the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia--differ markedly from those of Iran. Based on several discussions with senior members of the Six, the principles underpinning a deal must include: 1) sufficient response time in case of violations; 2) a nuclear program meeting Iran’s practical needs; 3) adequate irreversibility of constraints; 4) stable provisions; and 5) adequate verification.

Since 1972, IAEA safeguards has played a pivotal role in providing assurances that states live up to their NPT commitments. Today, the NPT and the IAEA continue to remain as foundations to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing proliferation. Over the span of time over which international safeguards has been around, it has been far from a static story.

In our dealings with the Iran nuclear issue, it is important to look at it from a strategic rather than a fire brigade, putting-out-small-fires short-term approach with regards to Iran’s nuclear aspirations. This is a choice of Realpolitik with long-term consequences.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime continues to face a broad array of challenges. It is easy to see why new solutions are needed. The world is undergoing rapid changes on many fronts—including technologically. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force 40 years ago. It should not surprise us that the solutions of 1970 are not a perfect fit to the challenges of the 21st century.

In my testimony today, I will focus on the verification aspects of elements needed in a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran, which is being negotiated as a next stage to the Joint Plan of Action concluded in Geneva on 24 November 2013. I base my remarks on the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and relevant UN Security Council resolutions in Iran, and complemented with experiences drawn, in particular from the IAEA verification activities in South Africa after its dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, Syria and North Korea.

With the onset of new gas centrifuge enrichment capacities, the World Nuclear Association expects that there will be in 2020 87 million SWU available to satisfy the estimated need of 60 million SWU. Most of the world’s enriched uranium will be produced by AREVA, CNNC, GLE, ROSATOM, and URENCO. In the light of these developments, there should be fairly little economical or security reasons for another country or commercial entity to embark on large enrichment projects elsewhere.

A long term, comprehensive solution under the Joint Plan of Action needs to ensure Iran uses nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. Any such agreement will be complex and require a range of interrelated provisions. We have evaluated five commonly discussed proposals based on a set of criteria, including breakout potential, reversibility, stability, and verifiability and found them flawed.

Much of the achievements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons can be attributed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and to the work of the nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nonetheless, the new cases of proliferation reveal weaknesses in the IAEA verification systems, and illustrate states’ willingness to circumvent international safeguards. These cases also highlight the need to recognize that safeguards verification is a work in progress that must adapt to evolving challenges and technology

“If we look at a little bit bigger picture and draw the lessons from the previous implementation of safeguards in Iran after 2003, read the lessons from North Korea, read the lessons from Syria, read the lessons from Libya, the most difficult thing is to confirm the absence of undeclared material and activities. This has traditionally been the big weakness of verification system.”

A transcript of a Foundation for Defense of Democracies' panel featuring Senior Fellow, Olli Heinonen.