A paper presented at The 12th Republic of Korea-United Nations Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues, Non-Proliferation Regime in the 21st Century: Challenges and the Way Forward, Jeju, Republic of Korea 14-15 November 2013.

Talks with Iran are gaining momentum, but its centrifuges are still enriching uranium, and its Arak facility may soon be capable of producing plutonium.

"South Africa - Verification Lessons from the Dismantled Nuclear Program"

presented in:

Nuclear Exits

Countries Foregoing the Nuclear Option

International Congress

Helsinki, Finland 18^th -19^th October, 2013

After reading the summary paper presented at a conference in Seoul on September 25, 2013, “New insights into North Korea’s gas centrifuge enrichment program” by Joshua Pollack, with the aid of R. Scott Kemp, we remain unconvinced about its central conclusions.  In particular, we disagree with several that have been widely reported in the media, such as that policies based on export controls, sanctions and interdiction “won’t get much traction” and a verifiable denuclearization deal may be “out of reach.”¹  We have identified several problems from the summary of the forthcoming analysis which would undermine those as well as other conclusions they draw.

Stopping Iran's increasingly rapid progress toward becoming a de facto nuclear weapons state requires significant diplomatic progress, and quickly.

Iran's new president will soon be tested on his ability and willingness to address international concerns about his country's nuclear program.

The 45-year-old NPT anchors states’ commitment to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s 40-year-old Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) premises its verification standard on the early detection of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or purposes unknown.  The Agency’s mission in ensuring that nuclear uses remain solely peaceful has been challenged and remains the case in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. There are lessons to be drawn from the IAEA’s inspection process concerning these countries, and in that context, future adjustments of safeguards methods to consider.

In a letter to the editor of the Economist, Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson respond to an earlier published letter on Iran's nuclear plans. They write:

Sir, We noted the letter (June 29^th (http://www.economist.com/news/letters/21580127-iran-coastal-homes-mexico-city-prismlondon-publishing-bosses-newcastle)from Sir Richard Dalton in response to your leader on Iran. We were concerned by this passage: “You did not mention that Iran has a policy of converting its 20% enriched uranium into oxide, ready for research-reactor fuelmaking. This puts the material beyond use for bombs (short of a time-consuming, detectable and technically demanding process to turn it back into gas, which can be discounted in the medium term).”

At a time when the possibility of military action against Iran's nuclear program is being debated, the need for a clear understanding of the issues and the controversial science and technology behind them has never been more acute. Toward that end, the Washington Institute and Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs have copublished an interactive online glossary of terms used in the discussion about Iran, prepared by proliferation expert Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen, former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Written at a time when Iran's nuclear issue, a subject of diplomatic efforts since 2003, remains unresolved, it would be reasonable to glean what explanations the book can provide to this end. Meanwhile, Iran has steadily progressed toward nuclear weapons capability and continues to disregard UN Security Council and IAEA resolutions. It is subject to increasingly tightened international sanctions and censure. Can Iran move away from steps that have caused its economy to tailspin and walk away from an isolated path?