Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a vigorous public and academic debate on which grand strategy the United States should pursue. It has also narrowed to essentially three positions. First, deep engagement proponents define U.S. interests broadly and advocate an expansive role for the U.S. military in the world. Second, restraint proponents define U.S. interests narrowly and advocate a moderately reduced U.S. military role. Third, neo-isolationists also define U.S. interests narrowly but advocate a drastically reduced U.S. military role.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

This presentation asks why states without nuclear weapons fight opponents with nuclear weapons. The presentation critically examines the claim that states believe opponents will not use nuclear weapons in conflict.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

Why do states challenge and resist states with vastly superior nuclear arsenals? This seminar argues that these asymmetric nuclear situations create both motives and opportunities for frequent, low-level conflict among interstate rivals. The seminar uses data on nuclear asymmetry and conflict from 1945–2000 as well as an examination of Soviet decision-making during the early Cold War to assess this claim.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.