Balancing theory suggests that China’s emergence as a global power should signal a transition from unipolarity to a multipolarity, but so far no such power shift has occurred. Nevertheless, given its expanding economy, China is increasingly challenging U.S. hegemony.  It remains unclear, however, whether China will strive to replace the United States as the sole global authority, modify the current system to allow for multipolarity, or continue to focus on internal development and enact the change to a Chinese order gradually.

The author is skeptical, however, of G. John Ikenberry’s key theoretical innovation of “binding institutions” (e.g., NATO and the WTO) to explain how interlocking institutional constraints effectively limit a hegemon’s power.

In this issue's correspondence section, Peter Feaver, Gunther Hellmann, Randall Schweller, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and William Wohlforth argue against points made in Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik's fall 1999 article "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" Legro and Moravcsik respond to their critics.

Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in “paltry and imprudent ways.”

Robert Jervis and Henry Nau respond to Randall Schweller's review of John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.