7 Events

A stack of books about nuclear weapons.

Mariana Budjeryn

Special Series - Open to the Public

Beyond the Nuclear Canon: Teaching the Bomb in the 21st Century

Fri., Sep. 23, 2022 | 10:00am - 12:00pm

Online

 

Over the past several decades, the nuclear field has developed a classical canon of seemingly sacred texts. These works are likely to be assigned in university-level courses on nuclear policy across the United States and the globe. Over the past few years, however, the nuclear field – just as affected by hierarchies and injustices as other social milieus – has been shaken by calls to critically rethink the global nuclear predicament and engage with more diverse voices and perspectives. This must involve interrogating the transmitter of nuclear knowledge: the academic syllabus. It is imperative to revisit how nuclear courses are taught, what questions are raised, and what texts are assigned. Accordingly, MTA brings together a group of exceptional scholars and long-time teachers of nuclear history and politics to discuss challenges, discoveries, frustrations, and the importance of teaching the bomb in the 21st century.

 

 

 

Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons protest.

Medact via Wikimedia Commons

Seminar - Open to the Public

Future Directions in the Study of Nuclear Disarmament

Mon., June 13, 2022 | 11:00am - 1:00pm

Online

The first Meeting of the States Parties to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will convene in Vienna, Austria at the end of June 2022. This seminal diplomatic meeting of states that argue nuclear weapons undermine global security occurs at a time marked by unprecedented anxiety over potential nuclear weapon use. Yet, academic debates in nuclear politics have for decades been dominated by questions related to nuclear deterrence, proliferation, and nonproliferation. Studies on nuclear disarmament have long received relatively little attention in mainstream scholarly discourse. As the TPNW emerges as a new element in the landscape of multilateral nuclear diplomacy, academic inquiry must keep pace with political realities.

Moderated by Matthew Fuhrmann, the panel features Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Kjølv Egeland, Hassan Elbahtimy, Stephen Herzog, Tamara Patton, and Olamide Samuel.

The panel is convened by MTA as part of the Research Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence.

While this virtual event is on the record, the event organizers prohibit any attendees, including journalists, from audio/visual recording or distributing parts or all of the event program without prior written authorization.

President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad makes a public speech at Columbia University in New York City, 24 September 2007.

Wikimedia CC/Daniella Zalcman

Seminar - Open to the Public

Causes and Consequences of Public Cueing in Nuclear Decision-Making

Thu., Jan. 28, 2021 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

This seminar seeks to examine the causes and consequences of public involvement in nuclear programs in two parts: first, exploring why some leaders involve the public in nuclear discussions, and then assessing shifts in public opinion in response to such cueing. Together, these  parts can help better understand when and how domestic publics can affect the trajectory of their states' nuclear programs.

Everyone is welcome to join us via Zoom! Register before the seminar here: 
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJEpceGprj0qHtYbTdT-_mgWIZVU_VNPqtZa

Cascade of gas centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium in the U.S. gas centrifuge plant in Piketon, Ohio, 1984.

DOE Photo

Seminar - Open to the Public

A-Bomb for the People: Domestic Drivers of Nuclear Latency

Thu., June 4, 2020 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

Online

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Though only nine states in the world today are believed to possess their own nuclear weapons, many more states have the capability to pursue a nuclear bomb if they choose. This capability – or nuclear latency – has recently drawn attention in international relations scholarship, which largely focuses on the effects of latency on international deterrence, compellence, and bargaining. While this research helps explain the security benefits and motives that may drive states to pursue nuclear capabilities short of the bomb, it has yet to determine how domestic politics play into these considerations. This project explores how public opinion factors into state decisions to pursue or forgo latent nuclear capabilities. In doing so, it seeks to offer new insight into when and why latency can become a salient topic to domestic audiences, and the implications of these domestic drivers for the future of nonproliferation.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwuc-qrqj4pG90vSX2_VoG35zaE6L6mkPQt

President Lyndon Johnson looking on as Secretary of State Dean Rusk prepares to sign the NPT, 1 July 1968.

Courtesy of Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Hegemon's Toolkit: U.S. Hegemony and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Thu., Oct. 11, 2018 | 12:15pm - 2:00pm

One Brattle Square - Room 350

Speaker: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is widely credited with contributing to international security through its promotion of nuclear restraint. Whereas almost all states in the international system are members of the NPT, many of these states have not signed on to additional treaties and agreements designed to strengthen the regime. Having already committed to foreswear the possession of nuclear weapons, why would some NPT members avoid taking steps to further the treaty's proclaimed goals? States' affinity to U.S. global leadership explains such variation.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.