9 Items

Ambassador Ivor Richard, left, of the United Kingdom, and U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young, right, raise their arms during vote, Friday, Nov. 4, 1977 at the United Nations Security Council.

(AP Photo/Dave Pickoff)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Caught Red-Handed: How States Wield Proof to Coerce Wrongdoers

| Fall 2021

States frequently acquire proof that other states have violated norms. Yet, existing theories do not fully explain how states wield such proof to coerce wrongdoers. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation probe a novel theory of how states coerce norm violators by concealing, sharing privately, or publicizing proof of guilt.

Wargame participants seated around a table

Courtesy of the MIT Political Science Department

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint

| Fall 2018

Declassified U.S. wargame records reveal that nuclear nonuse is partly a result of deterrence, but also because participants worried about their reputations or thought conventional weapons would be effective.