The Sydney and Paris attacks are manifestations of the long-predicted lone wolf threat posed by militant Islamism. Unfortunately, there will be more of these kind of attacks to come. In terms of understanding the threat, the evolution of pursuing “jihad” from a group basis to a focus on so-called “individual jihad” is a two-edged sword. In fact, the balance between group-based terrorism and encouraging lone wolf attacks is a matter of considerable debate in leadership levels of Islamist terrorists. A consensus in extremist circles seems to be forming around the idea that the “global jihad” sparked by al-Qaeda’s attack on America on 9/11 is best “managed” by a non-hierarchical approach that encourages local action, undertaken by independent groups or individuals.

Last week, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad where he notably left the door open for deploying additional US troops in an effort to defeat ISIL that, he claimed, will likely take years.

Before ISIL can be defeated, it must be contained and the ideological divide during the Cold War serves as a useful starting point for conceiving a containment strategy against ISIL.

After the United States and a five-member Arab coalition launched the first strikes against ISIL, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen offered four preliminary observations:

1. We should be conservative in assessing impact of the strikes.

2. It will be crucial to keep the Arab coalition directly involved as U.S. proceeds deeper into this campaign.

3. U.S. deployment of technological innovations that have been achieved over a decade of war may be coming together as a whole that is greater than the parts, reminiscent of the novel tactics the U.S. successfully waged to topple the Taliban in the fall of 2001.

4. In order for the re-assertion of U.S. and allied military power in the Middle East to be successful in the long term, U.S. strategy must take into account two problems that must be managed, each with its own distinct characteristics

Yesterday, I posted four preliminary observations about the campaign against ISIL. My fourth observation emphasized the point that the United States-led efforts against ISIL must recognize that the extremist group represents both a terrorist threat to the U.S., and an insurgency that threatens the stability of the Middle East. If the campaign against ISIL is to succeed, both of these issues must be recognized and addressed.

As a former Chief of Europe Division in the CIA, I have no comment to offer concerning the Germany espionage flap, of which I know nothing, save for what I have read in the press. My intent in offering these observations is not to explain alleged CIA actions in this case.  Rather, I am using this opportunity to provide a broader perspective, to relate the “rules of the game” of intelligence decision-making that applies the world over.  The senior policymaker in question could be President Obama, or Chancellor Merkel, or perhaps Vladimir Putin. To each of these leaders, I would give the same advice, if asked how to handle a spy-case:  there’s nothing novel here, nothing new. Let’s do what must be done and move on expeditiously, keeping our broader, shared interests in mind.

Researchers from the United States and Russia have issued a joint assessment of the global threat of nuclear terrorism, warning of a persistent danger that terrorists could obtain or make a nuclear device and use it with catastrophic consequences. The first joint threat assessment by experts from the world’s two major nuclear powers concludes: “If current approaches toward eliminating the threat are not replaced with a sense of urgency and resolve, the question will become not if but when, and on what scale, the first act of nuclear terrorism occurs.”

We asked nuclear policy experts in Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs to summarize in one paragraph the achievements in the year since President Obama convened a summit on nuclear security on April 12-13, 2010. And we asked for a second paragraph on what needs to be done in the year before the follow-up summit planned for Seoul, South Korea.

After more than two decades in intelligence with the CIA and U.S. Department of Energy, Rolf Mowatt­Larssen is now a senior fellow at the Belfer Center focusing on nuclear terrorism, domestic security, and al Qaeda’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ambitions. His most recent research report is titled “Al Qaeda’s Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism,” a follow­-up to his timeline of al Qaeda’s quest to acquire WMD. We asked Mowatt-­Larssen to share his views on al Qaeda's intent and justification for terrorism and to reflect on American life post­ 9/11 and the future of global intelligence.

"Over the years, cooperation between the US and Russia has waxed and waned. Trust has come and gone.  As we look to the future to find new  ways of  strengthening this enigmatic relationship, we should draw on propitious times in the past, when Russians and Americans managed to bridge the divide – most notably, during world war two.  History once again favors a genuine partnership between our two nations.  Today, there is more that unites us than divides us.  We confront common threats  of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the challenges of globalization and an interconnected world.  The question is: will we have the courage to do the right thing?"

We can not exclude the possibility of nuclear terrorism. It is not tomorrow's threat; it is with us here today. The game changing impact of a single mushroom cloud could destabilize the world order and raise fundamental doubts about the ability of governments to continue to provide security for their people.