8 Items

A Royal Air Force Reaper RPAS (Remotely Piloted Air System) at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan.

Sergeant Ross Tilly (RAF)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation

Claims that drones will soon remake warfare or international politics are unwarranted. Although almost a dozen states now possess armed drones, and more are racing to acquire them, they will not play a decisive role in interstate conflicts. Drones will rarely be “winning weapons,” because they are vulnerable to air defenses. States will, however, continue to use drones against terrorists and domestic opponents.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivers his speech near the Azadi (freedom) tower at a rally to mark the 33rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution that toppled the country's pro-Western monarchy, Tehran, Feb. 11, 2012.

AP Photo

Analysis & Opinions - Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

Ask the Experts: What Would Iran Do With a Bomb?

| February 21, 2012

"Iran's leaders, like those in other states, want to remain in power.  They want the regime in which they have invested and which serves their interests to endure.  Foreign policy, in addition to safeguarding Iran's borders and national integrity, is a means for safeguarding the regime.  Possession of a nuclear weapon will likely make Iran more impervious to attack and may make Iran bolder in its support for armed groups.  However, possessing a nuclear weapon will is not likely to alter Iran's paramount foreign policy goals of national and regime security."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a statement to members of the foreign press in Jerusalem, Jan. 11, 2011. He insisted that Iran will not stop its nuclear program unless economic sanctions are backed with a "credible military option."

AP Photo

Journal Article - The Journal of Strategic Studies

Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

| April 2011

"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."

This Aug. 5, 2007 satellite image provided Oct. 25, 2007 by DigitalGlobe shows a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria that Israel's Sep. 6, 2007, raid destroyed.

AP Photo

Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace

| October 2009

When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.

This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.

Canadian soldiers with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stand guard during a press conference on a prison attacked by Taliban militants in Kandahar province, June 15, 2008.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Security Studies

When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan

| July-September 2008

"Using the debate between the logic of appropriateness and consequences as a theoretical backdrop, I argue that neither is able to explain the United States' choices between unilateralism and multilateralism in post-Cold War military interventions....In this article, I suggest that "consequences" are best specified according to time horizon, which creates intertemporal tradeoffs between the long-term benefits of multilateralism and immediate payoffs of unilateralism, and the nature of the intervention, which affects the operational payoffs of multilateralism. I test this argument and the existing explanations against the case of Afghanistan. Its within-case variation — largely unilateral in combat operations and robustly multilateral in post-conflict phases — lends strong support to the logic of consequences as specified according to time horizon and operational payoff."

A Venezuelan National Guard soldier stands in front of a bus decorated with a photograph of President Hugo Chávez at a check point on the Venezuelan border with Colombia, March 6, 2008.

AP Photo

Analysis & Opinions - International Herald Tribune

Chávez Rattles His Saber

| March 6, 2008

"So far, the United States has refrained from responding to Chávez's antagonistic rhetoric. But the U.S. should be prepared for a more active approach if events escalate. The region might object to a direct U.S. military intervention, but Washington might consider quietly stepping up the supply of aid, training and equipment to Colombia."

African Union peacekeepers don berets in blue U.N. colors after removing their green African Union berets, in a ceremony outside the North Darfur capital of El Fasher, as the United Nations took partial control of the AU's peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

AP Photo

Journal Article - African Security Review

The United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and Prospects for Success

| December 1, 2007

With the security situation in Darfur remaining grim, the international community passed United Nations Security Resolution 1769 that authorised a more robust peacekeeping force. This article addresses the security concerns motivating the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), highlights the mandate and implications of the force, and compares the potential command and control issues to the experiences of the Somalia intervention in the 1990s. It closes by analysing the prospects for success of the intervention and offering some limited recommendations on ways to mitigate the risks associated with the peacekeeping effort.