Simon Saradzhyan explains how the growing gap between the U.S. and Russia negatively impacts many goals, both foreign and domestic, outlined in President Obama's second inaugural address, and argues that a deal between the two powers over America's ballistic missile defense (BMD) program in Europe could lead to greater Russian involvement and cooperation in American foreign policy objectives, leaving more time for Obama to address domestic concerns.

The U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Newsletter is a forum for discussing nuclear terrorism and actions to contribute to improved joint US-Russian assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Available in both English and Russian.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 stands out as not only one of the most dangerous moments in human history, but also as the most thoroughly researched case of a confrontation between two great powers that ended up being peacefully resolved. The wealth of evidence and quality of analysis that have been produced by participants and scholars of the October 1962 crisis make the latter an indispensable case study for anyone interested in management of any inter-state conflict.

This paper will explore which lessons of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis Armenian and Azeri leaders should consider institutionalizing if they wish to prevent reheating of their conflict over Nagorny Karabakh into a war.

The U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Newsletter is a forum for discussing nuclear terrorism and actions to contribute to improved joint US-Russian assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Available in both English and Russian.

Events of one August day in Russia's volatile republic of Dagestan have once again highlighted how turncoats can enhance terrorists' capabilities to carry out deadly attacks in the North Caucasus and other regions of Russia.

Half a year  since Vladimir Putin’s election for a third presidential team, it is crystal clear that the expectations of a “Putin 2.0” raised by his aides during the campaign are plain unrealistic (unless, of course, “2” refers to the number of years that some of the more vocal critics of the Kremlin may have to spend in prison).

Belfer Center Fellow Simon Saradzhyan offers an inside view of the Medvedev/Putin relationship and why Putin “had to come back to the Kremlin four years after stepping down and backing Medvedev to succeed him as Russia’s president.” Saradzhyan writes that this act may have been connected to Medvedev’s behavior or perceived behavior during the 2008 war in Georgia as noted in a YouTube clip showing three former high-ranking Russian commanders accusing Russia’s then Commander-in-Chief Dmitry Medvedev of indecisiveness during the initial stage of the 2008 war.

The U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Newsletter is a forum for discussing nuclear terrorism and actions to contribute to improved joint US-Russian assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Available in both English and Russian.

In a recent op-ed published in Russia in Global Affairs the Belfer Center's Kevin Ryan and Simon Saradzhyan argue that at a time when deep U.S. defense budget cuts are underway, supporters of continued U.S. missile defense development should consider the potential for cutting costs that cooperation with Russia could offer.