7 Items

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Correspondence: How Good Are China’s Antiaccess/ Area-Denial Capabilities

| Spring 2017

Andrew S. Erickson; Evan Braden Montgomery; and Craig Neuman respond to Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich's Summer 2016 article, "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia."

Aircraft assigned to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5 fly in formation above the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), Pacific Ocean, June 23, 2008.

Kyle D. Gahlau/ U.S. Navy

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia

| Summer 2016

Many policy analysts have suggested that China is developing antiaccess and area denial capabilities that could force the U.S. military out of the Western Pacific. The threat, however, is limited. China will likely acquire the ability to partially restrict the U.S. military's freedom of movement in the East and South China Seas, but the United States will maintain a sphere of influence sufficient to protect most of its allies in the region.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Correspondence: Assessing the Synergy Thesis in Iraq

| Spring 2013

John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser, and Anna Hanson; Jon R. Lindsay and Austin G. Long respond to Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro's summer 2012 International Security article, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?"

Sheikh Abdel Sattar Abu Risha, founder of al-Anbar Awakening, arrives for a meeting with tribal leaders of Iraq's Anbar province in Ramadi, Aug. 16, 2007. They vowed to "work together against terrorism, militias and al-Qaida...."

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Giving the Surge Partial Credit for Iraq's 2007 Reduction in Violence

| September 2012

Why did violence decline in Iraq in 2007? Many credit the "surge," or the program of U.S. reinforcements and doctrinal changes that began in January 2007. Others cite the voluntary insurgent stand-downs of the Sunni Awakening or say that the violence had simply run its course after a wave of sectarian cleansing. Evidence drawn from recently declassified data on violence at local levels and a series of seventy structured interviews with coalition participants finds little support for the cleansing or Awakening theses. This analysis constitutes the first attempt to gather systematic evidence across space and time to help resolve this debate, and it shows that a synergistic interaction between the surge and the Awakening was required for violence to drop as quickly and widely as it did.

A member of Arab Jabour Awakening, a movement of "concerned citizens" working with U.S. troops to provide security in the Sunni stronghold, center, strolls past two soldiers with 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment in a suburb south of Baghad.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?

| Summer 2012

Why did violence decline in Iraq in 2007? A new analysis suggests that a synergistic interaction between the surge and the Awakening caused the significant drop in violence, creating a set of circumstances that neither could have achieved alone.

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq

| Winter 2005/06

An in-depth analysis should first be made of the indigenous forces the United States might choose to work with as well as their skill level and motivation. When the latter proves comparable to that of the enemy, then the Afghan model is potentially powerful. When an ally's skill level and motivation is below that of its enemy, however, the model will have little to no effect on transforming defense policy.