The Tenth Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will take place from 1 to 26 August 2022 at the United Nations' in New York.

On Thursday, August 11, from 10am-12 pm, the Project on Managing the Atom will host an in-person only conference side-event titled "Atomic Backfires: How Great Power Nuclear Policies Fail" in Conference Room B.

This panel discussion will launch a book by the same name. Moderated by Francesca Giovannini, the panel will include the following speakers: David M. Allison, Sarah Bidgood, Hyun-Binn Cho, Stephen Herzog, and Ariel F. W. Petrovics.

For questions regarding event attendance and logistics, please contact Project on Managing the Atom's Project Coordinator, Marina Lorenzini, at mlorenzini@hks.harvard.edu. We are unable to provide badges to members of the public to enter the conference.

The first Meeting of the States Parties to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will convene in Vienna, Austria at the end of June 2022. This seminal diplomatic meeting of states that argue nuclear weapons undermine global security occurs at a time marked by unprecedented anxiety over potential nuclear weapon use. Yet, academic debates in nuclear politics have for decades been dominated by questions related to nuclear deterrence, proliferation, and nonproliferation. Studies on nuclear disarmament have long received relatively little attention in mainstream scholarly discourse. As the TPNW emerges as a new element in the landscape of multilateral nuclear diplomacy, academic inquiry must keep pace with political realities.

Moderated by Matthew Fuhrmann, the panel features Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Kjølv Egeland, Hassan Elbahtimy, Stephen Herzog, Tamara Patton, and Olamide Samuel.

The panel is convened by MTA as part of the Research Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence.

While this virtual event is on the record, the event organizers prohibit any attendees, including journalists, from audio/visual recording or distributing parts or all of the event program without prior written authorization.

Speaker: Stephen Herzog, Senior Researcher in Nuclear Arms Control, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich; Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Why do some treaties face difficult entry-into-force prospects after negotiators agree on their legal provisions? Multilateral nuclear arms control treaties, for example, often face far more contentious journeys to enter into force than their bilateral counterparts. These treaties usually indicate the number of states that must deposit ratification instruments, or may even require participation by specific states. To better understand such delays, Stephen Herzog presents a theory of treaty entry-into-force.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJUkd-mhqjsvHdH15Dg8RHMId9xyGBgKSpQB 

Speaker: Stephen Herzog, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Arms control has languished as a field of academic inquiry, despite a renaissance in nuclear security studies and significant advances in understanding proliferation. Few studies have attempted to emulate past academic shaping of arms control agreements and outcomes, with particularly limited emphasis on multilateral efforts. This is a problematic situation as the world looks beyond bilateral U.S.–Russian arms control toward the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (MENWFZ), and even the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The speaker attempts to fill this gap by offering a theory of state entry into multilateral nuclear arms control agreements.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJEtc-mrqz8jH9coGNTF7bloNM75UeKB3bJW

A seminar with Stephen Herzog, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program.

Co-sponsored by the Korea Institute at Harvard University.