"The Divider-in-Chief seems entirely comfortable with — and maybe even a little envious of — the various autocrats who are richer or more powerful than he is (or both) and free from those inconvenient constitutional constraints and checks and balances that keep getting in the way of Trump's feuds, whims, and destructive impulses."

"The central problem affecting the broader Middle East remains the lack of effective political institutions, compounded by repeated and sometimes violent interference in the region by various foreign powers (including the United States). This is true in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and it is the fear of such a future that has led the Saudi royal family to attempt a radical restructuring of its own economy and political institutions. Political and social conditions in these countries still inspire rage against ruling elite and anger at the foreign powers aligned with them, and, in some cases, that rage leads people to join radical movements and take up arms against their perceived oppressors."

Not only do Trump and the kaiser share some unfortunate personality traits, but there are also striking similarities between conditions in Wilhelmine Germany and the situation in the United States today. There are also some important differences, but they are not entirely reassuring.

"Unfortunately for Israel as well as the United States, the past 10 years provide ample evidence that our core argument is still correct. Nevertheless, shifts inside the pro-Israel community and in Israel itself may yet lead to positive shifts in U.S. Middle East policy and to a healthier relationship between the two countries." 

"...[T]here is a simple explanation for the decline in conquest that they do not consider, one that has nothing to do with law, norms, or the peace pact itself. Over the past century, the spread of nationalism from Europe to the periphery and an expanding global supply of small arms has dramatically increased the cost of conquering and subduing a foreign population and then incorporating them within one's own polity. Once the idea of national self-determination had spread around the globe, local populations were willing to fight and die to expel foreign occupiers, and the spread of small arms and high explosives made it much easier for them to make occupiers pay."

"If you want to understand the foreign policy of a great power, therefore (and probably lesser powers as well), a good place to start is to look at the great wars it has fought. And for most of the major powers, the last great war is still World War II. If one asks what this perspective to some contemporary powers, what might it reveal?"

"Of course, it won’t surprise you that the people who keep trying to dismantle the JCPOA are mostly the same people who’ve repeatedly called for military action against Iran. And guess what? They are for the most part the same strategic geniuses that told you toppling Saddam Hussein would be easy and cheap and would transform the Middle East into a sea of shiny pro-American democracies."

"One overlooked feature in this ongoing tragedy is that Trump isn't wrong about everything. Some of his critics won't admit it, but several of the themes he sounded during the 2016 campaign — such as the need to rebuild America's deteriorating infrastructure — were correct (if far from original), and some of his foreign-policy instincts were sound even if his command of details was not. A minimally competent president could have made substantial progress on most if not all of these fronts, thereby leaving the country better off and enhancing his prospects for a second term."

"As a bargaining technique, the madman theory has a certain logical coherence to it....is there any evidence that this approach actually works in the real world of international diplomacy? If the madman theory were a useful guide to statecraft, then past world leaders with a well-deserved reputation for unpredictability, impulsiveness, irascibility, violence, and bizarre behavior should have been extremely successful at getting what they want. Is that in fact the case? What does the historical record show?"

"...[I]t remains to be seen if all of the signatories will even deliver on their pledge to cut off roughly $1 billion worth of North Korean trade. It is one thing to sign a resolution but quite another to halt valuable trade ties or crack down on illicit smuggling networks and other clandestine deals. Sanctions efforts are always somewhat porous, and my bet is that North Korea will find ways to get around some of these restrictions while some of signatories conveniently look the other way."