Throughout modern history, and particularly since the onset of the industrial revolution, technology has had profound, if often ill understood, implications for the capacity to wage war.

In the abstract, it is possible to conceive of a world dominated by arms control, one in which the advantages of striking first were eliminated, incentives to attack had been removed, the arms competition had been restrained, levels of forces had been substantially reduced, and military expenditures had been cut.

In the public debate over defense issues, one of the striking developments of recent developments of recent years has been the emergence of a broad-based assault on U.S. conventional defense policies and practices.

Disappointment with negotiated arms control as it has been practiced over the past two decades is widespread and is found as much among proponents as among critics.

The latest major twist in the 10-year saga of the MX missile took place last April 11 when the President's Commission on Strategic Forces—headed by General Brent Scowcroft (USA F Ret)—issued its report.

The emergence of a movement to challenge the Reagan Administration's assertion that there is a national consensus skeptical of arms control and in favor of rearmament has set off a struggle for the domination of public opinion on nuclear weapons policies.

In recent months, we have seen Secretary of Defense Harold Brown warn that our land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are vulnerable to Soviet attack, the ratification of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) languish in the Senate, President Jimmy Carter's Directive 59 emphasize counterforce targeting, and the Republican platform call for some form of military security.

Naval power is known to be a useful instrument of national policy and has frequently been employed since World War II to support the interests of the United States.