An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict.

The issue concludes with letters on two articles that appeared in the spring 1999 issue of International Security. First, one author counters several points made by the other author in his article "India's Pathway to Pokhran II." He responds.

May 1998 signaled a major turning point in the nuclear arms race in South Asia. The author cites three factors that combined in setting the stage for India's decision to detonate five nuclear devices on May 11 and 13.