In The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide,Gary Bass argues that both the Nixon administration and the global community purposely ignored Pakistan’s genocide of civilians in East Pakistan. Sumit Ganguly reviews the book and reflects on the significance of the 1971 genocide.

Pakistan has used religiously motivated militant forces as a central part of its grand strategy since its founding, relying on armed groups to compensate for its material and political weaknesses. Recently, however, many of these groups have grown in strength and are looking to pursue their own agendas instead of bending to Pakistan’s will. Pakistan is thus caught in a jihad paradox: the very characteristic of the Pakistani state that makes supporting Islamist militancy useful also makes it extremely dangerous to Pakistan’s internal stability. Pakistan must recognize that its current policy has outlived its utility and work to defeat the militant organizations operating in its territory.

An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict.

The issue concludes with letters on two articles that appeared in the spring 1999 issue of International Security. First, one author counters several points made by the other author in his article "India's Pathway to Pokhran II." He responds.

May 1998 signaled a major turning point in the nuclear arms race in South Asia. The author cites three factors that combined in setting the stage for India's decision to detonate five nuclear devices on May 11 and 13.