At the core of the Iran nuclear negotiations, there are two fundamental questions: what work has Iran already accomplished towards a nuclear weapon and how can the United States guarantee that it has stopped and will not resume? If these questions are not answered correctly and completely before the negotiations conclude, the resulting agreement will be little more than an illusion. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has spoken forcefully and repeatedly on the so-called “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, and its director general, Yukiya Amano, hasfrequently implored Iran to respond to agency inquiries on the matter.

William Tobey, senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, participated in a panel hosted by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The panel concluded that a final deal with Iran will require a full declaration of nuclear related activities undertaken by Iran in order to determine the inspection measures necessary to monitor the Iranian program. It also stated that an agreement should provide a mechanism for reporting violations and managing disputes, and authorizing challenge inspections of sites in Iran. The panel also suggested that verification will need to be augmented by national intelligence capacities, be conducted by expert personnel with the latest equipment, and monitor the importation of dual-use technology items. The panel concluded that over time the rigor of inspections will probably decline, and so it is important to remain vigilant and prevent “inspections fatigue."

As nuclear negotiations with Iran near their final stage, the question of inspections has come to the fore. If a final agreement is reached, inspections will be a principal means of assuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, either by “breakout” at declared facilities, or by “sneakout” using secret sites. Given the importance being placed on inspections, what type will be necessary?  What inspection and verification regime will be needed to facilitate compliance, detect violations, and ensure effective enforcement?

William H. Tobey, Matthew Bunn, and Nickolas Roth oppose proposed legislation that would prohibit funding for fixed radiation detectors to catch nuclear smugglers. They argue for a balanced program to defeat nuclear smuggling that includes strong security, effective law enforcement and intelligence work, and interdiction efforts and border controls backed by both fixed and mobile radiation detectors.

William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, gave testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee regarding Iran's compliance with its nuclear-related obligations. Specifically, he raised concerns about prior failures of Iran to meet its commitments, especially the potential military dimensions of its program, and suggested that a history of noncompliance raises concerns about Iran's future behavior in relation to any new commitments undertaken in a comprehensive nuclear deal.

The recently announced framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program may herald a potential breakthrough in the difficult nuclear negotiations, but it remains only a framework, with key details still to be filled in. Five members of the Belfer Center's Iran Working Group--Graham Allison, Chuck Freilich, Martin Malin, Payam Mohseni, and William Tobey--comment on some of the aspects of the agreement, and its potential regional and international impact.

William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in Foreign Policy that the framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1 remains incomplete. He highlights issues such as the fact that the American and Iranian fact sheets diverge on key details, a lack of specificity on measures to prevent an Iranian breakout attempt through undeclared nuclear sites, and the statements by both Secretary of State John Kerry and others that points of disagreement remain, and suggests that support for the agreement should not be proffered before the final terms of the deal are made public.

Six world powers—the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, or the P5+1—and Iran announced a framework agreement Thursday on limitations to the Iranian nuclear program. In the wake of the announcement, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists asked numerous experts on the situation to offer their assessments of the framework agreement.

Last Thursday, the Obama administration announced a framework nuclear agreement with Iran that is both more detailed and restrictive than what had been foreshadowed by leaks or feared by critics. If such an accord were implemented, it would earn Secretary of State John Kerry and his team substantial credit. But is this agreement strong enough to block Iran’s paths to nuclear weapons? Or is it illusory? The answer may be that we do not yet know.

Preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is vital to U.S. national security interests. A key aspect of that matter is Iran’s compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other related agreements. It is a broad subject, but I understand the Committee has specific interests, so I will confine my statement to those topics.