5 Upcoming Events

A mockup of the Fat Man nuclear device.

U.S. Department of Defense

Seminar - Open to the Public

The Elite Taboo Against Using Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Wargames

Wed., Feb. 21, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Littauer Building, Fainsod Room, Littauer-324

Speaker: Reid Pauly, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Is there a normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons? Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the existence of a norm of nuclear non-use among the American people. But the public does not make decisions about using nuclear weapons. In this presentation, Pauly investigates the willingness of American policymakers to use nuclear weapons through the history of political-military wargaming. He tests competing theories about the use and non-use of nuclear weapons by examining both whether strategic elites were willing to use nuclear weapons in different scenarios and how they explained those decisions.

Seminar - Harvard Faculty, Fellows, Staff, and Students

Resilience, Risk, and Reinforcements for Arctic Communities on the Edge

Wed., Feb. 21, 2018 | 12:30pm - 1:45pm

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Taubman Building, Darman Seminar Room, First Floor

The Arctic Initiative will host a seminar with Joel Clement, former Director of the U.S. Department of the Interior's Policy Office, discussing risk and resilience of Arctic communities in the face of climate change.

Lunch will be provided.


Seminar - Open to the Public

Solving the Jurisdictional Conundrum: The Use of Domestic Civil Courts to Disrupt Overseas Illicit Procurement

Wed., Apr. 4, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

1 Brattle Square - Room 350

Speaker: Aaron Arnold, Associate Project on Managing the Atom; Assistant Professor at Curry College

Over the past two decades, the United States has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions and export restrictions, such as those imposed against Iran and North Korea, in order to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One vexing problem, however, is how to contend with jurisdictional hurdles when the violations occur overseas, in countries that are unable or unwilling to assist US enforcement efforts. To solve this problem, US prosecutors are turning to strategies with significant extraterritorial implications— that is, exercising legal authority beyond national borders. One such tool is to use civil legal procedures to seize assets linked to sanctions or export control violations in jurisdictions that lack cooperative arrangement with US enforcement agencies. While this may be an attractive strategy to bolster enforcement efforts against overseas illicit procurement such tools are not without consequence.


Seminar - Open to the Public

The Past, Present, and Future Development of International Safeguards for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

Wed., Apr. 11, 2018 | 10:00am - 11:30am

1 Brattle Square - Room 350

Speaker: Mark Walker, Ph.D. Candidate in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

This seminar presents the results of archival research undertaken in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany into the origins of international safeguards approaches for gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). Archival documents indicate that multilateral discourse on GCEP safeguards was dominated in the 1970s and early 1980s by political disagreements over a number of safeguards issues, including inspector effort, inspector access, and the role of the IAEA in verifying undeclared nuclear material and activities. While the gridlock that ensued over these questions necessitated the creation of the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), a technical forum in which technology holders and inspectorates were to agree once and for all on an approach for safeguards at GCEPs, some contentious HSP issues (including the question of cascade access) were still largely resolved through political compromise. Following a discussion of the factors that led to the 1983 HSP safeguards approach, the legacy of the HSP approach on the state of play of modern GCEP safeguards will be discussed, along with paths forward for ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of GCEP safeguards in coming years.