19 Items

WWI Centenary Commemorated at the Tower of London in 2014 with 888,246 ceramic poppies

Shawn Spencer-Smith/ Flickr

Analysis & Opinions - Atlantic Council

100 Years Later: Reflecting on the Lessons of World War I

| Nov. 11, 2018

"An abiding lesson for the United States is that we must remain committed to Europe—to our democratic allies in NATO as well as to our strategic partnership with the European Union," writes Professor Nicholas Burns, Faculty Chair of the Belfer Center's Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, in his reflection on the 100 years since the end of the First World War on November 11, 1918.

The Republican Palace in Baghdad, Iraq, 22 Feb. 2010. The palace served as the headquarters of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the Green Zone developed around it.

Creative Commons

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

Don't Knock Offshore Balancing Until You've Tried It

| December 8, 2016

"Offshore balancing has not failed in the Middle East because it hasn't been U.S. strategy for almost a generation. The United States did act like an offshore balancer from 1945 to about 1990: It had vital interests in the region and wanted to prevent any state (including the Soviet Union) from controlling the Gulf. But it pursued this goal first by relying on Great Britain (until 1967) and then by turning to local allies like the shah of Iran. After the shah fell in 1979, the United States created the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) so it could affect the balance of power swiftly and directly and thus deter a possible Soviet foray into the Gulf. But it didn't park the RDF in the Gulf or elsewhere in the region; instead, it kept it offshore and over the horizon and didn't use it until Iraq seized Kuwait in August 1990."

In this photo provided by the Syrian Civil Defense group known as the White Helmets, taken Sept. 23, 2016, a destroyed ambulance is seen outside the Syrian Civil Defense main center after airstrikes in the rebel-held part of eastern Aleppo, Syria.

AP

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

The Great Myth About U.S. Intervention in Syria

| October 24, 2016

"...[B]y far the worst argument for intervening in Syria is the suggestion that greater U.S. involvement is necessary to preserve U.S. credibility, to maintain its reputation as a distinctly moral great power, or to preserve the respect of allies and adversaries alike. The historical record shows that not intervening in humanitarian tragedies has had little impact on America's standing in the past, and the same is true today."

Street memorial to the November 2015 Paris attacks in Berlin, Germany, November 14, 2015.

Creative Commons

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

Don't Give ISIS What It Wants

| November 16, 2015

"...[S]tep one is not to fall into the obvious trap the Islamic State has set. If we buy into its vision of relentless cultural, religious, and civilizational conflict, we could easily act in ways that make its vision a reality. Given how weak the Islamic State is today, the last thing we should do is encourage anyone to see it as heroic or farsighted."

ISIS as Revolutionary State

Creative Commons

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Affairs

ISIS as Revolutionary State

| November/December 2015

"Regional actors will no doubt try to pass the buck and get Americans to do their fighting for them. U.S. leaders should reject such ploys politely but firmly and pass the buck right back. ISIS is not an existential threat to the United States, to Middle Eastern energy supplies, to Israel, or to any other vital U.S. interest, so U.S. military forces have no business being sent into harm's way to fight it."

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

Why Do So Many People Want So Little From the Agreement With Iran?

| September 15, 2015

"...[K]eeping Iran at arm's length (or worse) reduces U.S. diplomatic leverage and flexibility. As long as U.S. Middle East policy remains fixated on its 'special relationships' with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and to some extent Egypt, these states will continue to take U.S. support for granted and ignore U.S. preferences more often than we'd like. But if the United States had decent working relations with every state in the region — including Iran — it could work constructively with any or all of them."

Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Sanctions Against Iran: A Guide to Targets, Terms, and Timetables

| June 2015

To assist Members of Congress and observers in analyzing these issues and judging a potential comprehensive agreement, the Belfer Center prepared this brief to outline the key facets of sanctions against Iran. Written as an addendum to our April policy brief, ‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal,’ this report is driven by the policy debate’s leading questions.

Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal

| April 2015

On April 2, 2015, the E.U. (speaking on behalf of the P5+1 countries) and Iran announced agreement on “key parameters” for a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. The E.U.-Iran Joint Statement is buttressed by unilateral facts sheets issued by the U.S. and Iran, which provide further details of the framework accord. Negotiators now turn to translating this framework accord into a final comprehensive agreement by June 30, 2015. Members of Congress and their staffs, as well as informed citizens, are now focusing on the Iranian challenge and assessing the framework accord. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School has prepared this Policy Brief summarizing key facts, core concepts, and major arguments for and against the current deal aimed at stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The purpose of this Policy Brief is not to advocate support for or opposition to the tentative deal that has been negotiated, but rather to provide an objective, nonpartisan summary to inform Members and others in coming to their own conclusions. The team of experts who prepared this report includes Democrats, Republicans, Independents, and internationals, who have many disagreements among themselves but who agree that this Brief presents the essentials objectively.