19 Items

Joe Biden and Justin Trudeau shake hands

AP Photo/Andrew Harnik, File

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

Biden and Trudeau Need to Talk About the Arctic

| Mar. 18, 2023

Arctic Initiative Co-Director John Holdren and Senior Fellow Fran Ulmer call for increased U.S.-Canadian cooperation on geopolitical challenges around relations with Russia and China as well as the critical problems being imposed by climate change on the North American Arctic.

juvenile Arctic cod

Shawn Harper, University of Alaska Fairbanks

Journal Article - Polar Record

The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Moratorium: A Rare Example of the Precautionary Principle in Fisheries Management

| Jan. 16, 2023

This paper explores the unique conditions that made the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean possible and examines how success was achieved by the interrelationships of science, policy, legal structures, politics, stakeholder collaboration, and diplomacy.

Roland Timerbaev.

University of California Irvine/Quest for Peace via YouTube

Analysis & Opinions - Arms Control Today

Roland Timerbaev (1927–2019), At the Vanguard of Nuclear Nonproliferation

| September 2019

From the 1950s, after a brief stint at the fledgling United Nations, Timerbaev was directly supporting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on nuclear weapons issues. (He remembered drafting the first Soviet proposal for a fissile material cutoff treaty in 1958.)  Preventing nuclear annihilation became his consuming, life-long passion. He retired from the Foreign Ministry just as the Soviet Union was collapsing, resigning as permanent representative to the international organizations in Vienna, including, of course, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

A Theory of Engagement With North Korea

| May 2019

At the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, the United States and North Korea reached a familiar impasse—diplomacy broke down over the appropriate order of near-term steps, and the world was left wondering whether any package of rewards would be enough to incentivize denuclearization.

In a new Managing the Atom Discussion Paper, Christopher Lawrence outlines an alternative conceptual framework for engaging North Korea. Rather than offering rewards for nuclear rollback, the approach focuses on building credibility around the notion of a shared political future. Lawrence suggests that physical actions—such as shared investments in integrated rail, electricity, or mining infrastructure—speak more credibly about the political future for all the parties involved than do written commitments or more transient “carrots” and “sticks.” The international relationships created by infrastructure projects may alter North Korea's security calculus over time, and incrementally reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons. Drawing lessons from the 1994 Agreed Framework, Lawrence reinterprets the history of nonproliferation engagement with North Korea, and illuminates possible opportunities to break the diplomatic impasse after the Hanoi summit.

Trump and Kim shake hands at the Hanoi summit meeting on February 27, 2019 (Shealah Craighead/Official White House Photo).

Shealah Craighead/Official White House Photo

Analysis & Opinions - The Diplomat

After the Hanoi Summit: Next Steps for the US, North Korea, and Vietnam

| Mar. 02, 2019

In the aftermath of the Hanoi summit, it is important to assess how U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will proceed to avoid a collapse of the denuclearization process as well as how Vietnam can reap long-term benefits for its international profile and tourism industry. It may be the case that the Hanoi summit was a failure, but a necessary one in the context of growing unrealistic expectations from both Washington and Pyongyang. Vietnam still has a lot to do after the summit to continue contributing to North Korea’s reform and denuclearization.

The delegation of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry led by Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, left, meets with North Korea Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Feb. 13, 2019 (Cha Song Ho/Associated Press).

Cha Song Ho/Associated Press

Analysis & Opinions - The Diplomat

Trump-Kim 2: Why Hanoi?

| Feb. 15, 2019

It was finally revealed by Trump via his usual communication channel – Twitter – that Hanoi was the venue for the much-anticipated meeting. It is most likely that the choice of venue was made with consent from Kim; thus the decision also gave clues as to North Korea’s intentions in participating in, and plans for the upcoming Hanoi summit.

Hanoi (a_brlnr via Flickr)

a_brlnr via Flickr

Analysis & Opinions - The Diplomat

Why Vietnam Should Host the Second Trump-Kim Summit

| Jan. 16, 2019

Last week, CNN reported that Hanoi, alongside with Bangkok and Hawaii l, has been shortlisted by the United States as possible venue for a second summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. At the same time, citing an anonymous South Korean diplomat, the Korean Herald put Hanoi, Hawaii, and Singapore instead of Bangkok as top candidates for the follow-up meeting between the leaders of the United States and North Korea after their historic talk in Singapore last year. According to another South Korean newspaper, the Munhwa Ilbo, it was also Hanoi where American and North Korean officials met recently to discuss the planning for this event.

In this image made from video provided by Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), South Korean President Moon Jae-in, left, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pose after signing documents in Pyongyang on Sept. 19, 2018 (Korea Broadcasting System via AP).

Korea Broadcasting System via AP

Analysis & Opinions - War on the Rocks

A Window into Kim's Nuclear Intentions? A Closer Look at North Korea's Yongbyon Offer

| Jan. 15, 2019

Is North Korea serious about denuclearizing in exchange for a new peace architecture on the Korean Peninsula? Analysts are split on the matter. Many reject the possibility out of hand, insisting that the regime views nuclear weapons as essential to its identity and security for the indefinite future. Others point to North Korea’s security environment as the root cause of its perceived need for nuclear weapons, and suggest that if its hostile environment were to change, the regime might be less committed to remaining a nuclear weapons state.