International Security

Why does the U.S. Army rely on persuasion to influence military partners to improve their forces despite repeated failures that undermine U.S. foreign policy goals? The army prioritizes its role as a fighting force, not an advisory group. U.S. leaders have developed an ideology—the cult of the persuasive—to advance army bureaucratic interests.

International Security Program Fellow Megan M. Turnbull, an international affairs professor at the University of Georgia, discussed the conditions leading to election violence in Nigeria during a virtual seminar hosted by the International Security Program on November 10, 2022.

A state’s declining international status activates two sets of social psychological dynamics that contribute to domestic conflict, alienating some groups and intensifying others’ nationalism. These dynamics can contribute to center-periphery conflict in multinational states after acute status loss.

Stephen Walt argues that opponents of the withdrawal from Afghanistan are blocking foreign policy changes the United States desperately needs.

White Southerners opposed to Reconstruction used violence to undermine Black political power and force uncommitted white Southerners to their side. Although structural factors made it harder for the U.S. government to suppress this violence, a series of policy failures prompted Reconstruction’s failure and generations of injustice.

As the United States emerges from the era of so-called forever wars, it should abandon the regime change business for good. Then, Washington must understand why it failed, writes Stephen Walt.

Election violence varies significantly within countries, yet how and why are undertheorized. An analysis of gubernatorial elections in Nigeria reveals the conditions under which elites recruit popular social-movement actors for preelection violence.

Stephen Walt But poses the following question: What if foreign policy isn't as important as foreign-policy mavens maintain? What if developments and policies inside the country are far more consequential—at least most of the time—than what its leaders do on the global stage?

Unlike state sponsors, which value proxies primarily for their military utility, nonstate sponsors use proxies mainly for their perceived political value. An analysis of three case studies—al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the People’s Protection Units in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon—illustrates this argument.

In post-conflict societies, divisions can emerge between returnee and nonmigrant groups, which can in turn lead to violence and destabilization when government institutions favor one group over another.