963 Items

An F-35A Lightning II flies above the Mojave Desert

USAF/Public Domain

Analysis & Opinions - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

To Enhance National Security, the Biden Administration Will Have to Trim an Exorbitant Defense Wish List

| Mar. 13, 2024

David Kearn argues that even in the absence of restrictive resource and budgetary constraints, a focus on identifying and achieving concrete objectives that will position the United States and its allies to effectively deter aggression in critical regional flashpoints should be the priority given the stressed nature of the defense industrial base and the nuclear enterprise.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, foreground, at a White House strategy session. Pictured from the left are: Secretary of State William P. Rogers. U.S. President Richard Nixon, and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.

AP/Bob Daugherty

Journal Article - H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum

Miller on Trachtenberg and Jervis on SALT

| Sep. 27, 2023

At a moment when arms control is deeply troubled and may be dying, two eminent scholars, Marc Trachtenberg and the late Robert Jervis, have taken a fresh look at the beginnings of strategic arms control fifty years after the signing in Moscow of the SALT I agreements in May of 1972. They do so from different vantage points, writes Steven E. Miller.

President George W. Bush thanks U.S. troops in Al Asad, Iraq, Sept. 3, 2007. He stands at a podium in front of rows of troops in uniform.

Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen/U.S. Air Force

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political Costs of Civilian Control

    Author:
  • Andrew Payne
| Summer 2023

Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character of elite decision-making. A case study of civil-military dynamics during the Iraq War identifies four decision-making strategies that George W. Bush and Barack Obama used to avoid incurring a domestic political penalty for rejecting the military’s preferences.

Visitors tour past military vehicles carrying the Dong Feng 41 and DF-17 ballistic missiles at the Beijing Exhibition Hall in Beijing on Oct. 12, 2022.

AP Photo/Andy Wong

Journal Article - International Security

The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture

    Authors:
  • Henrik Stålhane Hiim
  • M. Taylor Fravel
  • Magnus Langset Trøan
| Spring 2023

Chinese strategists increasingly believe that U.S. nonnuclear strategic capabilities threaten China’s nuclear forces. Although there is limited evidence of a shift in its nuclear strategy, China is changing its strategic posture to ensure its second-strike capability, including by relying on advanced conventional weapons (e.g., counterspace capabilities, cyber weapons, and electronic warfare) that can target U.S. missile defense. The dynamics of a nuclear-conventional entangled security dilemma may weaken arms race stability.

Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida

David Mareuil/Pool Photo via AP, File

Analysis & Opinions - Project Syndicate

Japan's Strategic Imperative

| Feb. 02, 2023

Joseph Nye argues that in the face of the threats posed by China, Russia, and North Korea, Japan's self-defense depends more than ever on the strength of its alliances. By significantly increasing its own defense spending and pursuing closer military cooperation with the United States, the current government is moving in the right direction.

U.S. Army Soldiers share tactics and training with Nigerian Army Soldiers, Nigeria, February 8, 2018.

Capt. James Sheehan, U.S. Army

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Cult of the Persuasive: Why U.S. Security Assistance Fails

    Author:
  • Rachel Tecott Metz
| Winter 2022/23

Why does the U.S. Army rely on persuasion to influence military partners to improve their forces despite repeated failures that undermine U.S. foreign policy goals? The army prioritizes its role as a fighting force, not an advisory group. U.S. leaders have developed an ideology—the cult of the persuasive—to advance army bureaucratic interests.