International Security

This written testimony to the UK Parliament's Defence Select Committee focuses on the continuing challenges posed to the United Kingdom by the weakness of state institutions and the resultant instability, civil war, and insurgency in the Middle East and North Africa. It argues that the spillover effects of this state weakness threaten the UK directly and the cohesion of its vital European security partnerships.To avoid a cycle of inaction followed by tardy and inappropriate over-reaction, the UK needs to work with its international partners to craft a strategy of sustained engagement towards the region.

NATO after Afghanistan is an organization that suffers from a certain fatigue pertaining to future stabilization challenges. NATO will not automatically cease to conduct operations after 2014, but the level of ambition will be lower. The Afghanistan experience and the failures of the light footprint approach calls for a thinking that is less liberalist "in the abstract" and more focused on provision of basic services (security, development, and governance).

...[A]fter adopting a policy, decisionmakers should resist the temptation to marginalize any skeptics. Indeed, it may be advisable for someone to deliberately play the role of "devil's advocate" and question optimistic appraisals of likely outcomes. Following the 2002–03 decision to invade Iraq, U.S. war planners were extremely overconfident about the prospects for stabilizing the country. Skeptical voices were sidelined or excluded. If senior officials had anticipated the shift to implemental mind-sets and the associated overconfidence, a "devil's advocate" would have helped to challenge shaky assumptions behind the strategy.

"Husbanding resources is simply sensible. In the competitive game of power politics, states must unsentimentally realign means with ends or be punished for their profligacy. Attempts to maintain policies advanced when U.S. relative power was greater are outdated, unfounded, and imprudent. Retrenchment policies—greater burden sharing with allies, less military spending, and less involvement in militarized disputes—hold the most promise for arresting and reversing decline."

Despite the longstanding and ever-evolving "special relationship" between the United States and Israel, the two allies do not appear to have engaged in substantive discussions on key facets of their most pressing mutual concern, the Iranian nuclear threat. Specifically, there has been little if any dialogue on the possibility of military action if the diplomatic route comes to a dead end, nor on the possible means of living with a nuclear Iran should both countries decide to refrain from military action.

Joseph S. Nye and Richard Armitage testify before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Smart Power and the U.S. Strategy for Security in the Post-9/11 World

"Hizballah is quite open about not playing by the normal rules of engagement. As Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah stated in early August, "We are not a regular army, and we don't fight like a regular army." Hizballah very clearly operates out of heavily populated civilian areas, and its fighters are often outwardly innocent-looking workers during the day and warriors at night, making the distinction between civilian and combatant even more difficult. Their offices and infrastructure are often in the midst of, below, or inside residential apartment buildings, usually within a sympathetic city or suburb."

"...Israel must face up to reality, draw the appropriate conclusions, make the best of a bad situation, and now seek to turn adversity into long-term advantage. This analysis looks at how the current situation evolved, and possible future steps."

"...it is clear that unilateral measures, in and of themselves, are an inherently undesirable course of action, that they will not bring an end to violence and terror, nor enable the resolution of the truly difficult issues...."

Dr. Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.