Science, Technology, and Public Policy

Speaker: Julius Weitzdörfer, Junior Professor of East Asian Law, Hagen University, Germany

Risks stemming from CBRN-terrorism (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) are characterized by relatively low frequency, yet extraordinary potential impact. To help reduce the enormous potential costs associated with radiological and nuclear terrorism, drawing on cases from Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this seminar seeks to derive and improve recovery policies towards a well-rounded, holistic approach to mitigating the risks of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Register in advance for this meeting: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJAoc-yhrjwrEtEXOUTdHqGhMvLscB5VO38u

Speakers: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom; Ariel Petrovics, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Though only nine states in the world today are believed to possess their own nuclear weapons, many more states have the capability to pursue a nuclear bomb if they choose. This capability – or nuclear latency – has recently drawn attention in international relations scholarship, which largely focuses on the effects of latency on international deterrence, compellence, and bargaining. While this research helps explain the security benefits and motives that may drive states to pursue nuclear capabilities short of the bomb, it has yet to determine how domestic politics play into these considerations. This project explores how public opinion factors into state decisions to pursue or forgo latent nuclear capabilities. In doing so, it seeks to offer new insight into when and why latency can become a salient topic to domestic audiences, and the implications of these domestic drivers for the future of nonproliferation.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwuc-qrqj4pG90vSX2_VoG35zaE6L6mkPQt

Why do some efforts by the international community to manage and mitigate nuclear risks succeed while others fail? This seminar develops an analytical framework that moves beyond extant explanations focused on self-interest and explores how cognitive beliefs, implementation practices, and their interplay inform interests, thereby shaping institutional effectiveness. Evidence is drawn from three cases of multilateral cooperative engagement in nuclear security and counterterrorism.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

While there is international consensus that the country producing the nuclear waste is responsible for its disposal, policymakers are increasingly turning to the possibility of multinational repositories. Multinational repositories and other arrangements to jointly store or dispose of nuclear waste have evident safety, security, and non-proliferation benefits, but they also bring a number of ethical concerns.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? This presentation will offer a new typology of the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy. The typology allows scholars to move beyond simple claims of “nuclear emboldenment,” and allows for more nuanced predictions and empirical examinations of the ways in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of current and future nuclear states. In this seminar, MTA/ISP Research Fellow Mark Bell will demonstrate the utility of this typology using a “hard” case: the United Kingdom.

This seminar will discuss how decision-makers are trying to cope with nuclear security issues in an age of budget uncertainty.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

This seminar will argue that the persistent demand for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) services has resulted in a routinization of international delegation of autonomy and capacity to the IAEA, transforming it from super-power pawn to a multinational forum and now into an agency of global governance—an international nuclear authority.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

A conversation with Joseph Krol, Associate Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Agency's Office of Emergency Operations, about preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies.

Professor Trevor Findlay will present preliminary findings of his research on how the paramount global governance body in the nuclear field is fulfilling its mandate and how it might be strengthened and reformed.

Please join us! Coffee, tea, and decaf will be provided.

The United States is currently facing a monumental challenge in its efforts to cope with hostile nuclear proliferators. The policies and the military capabilities that served the United States during the Cold War are less effective in today's environment. The U.S. government must re-valuate its military capabilities and adjust its strategy to effectively cope with hostile states.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come-first served basis.